Prof. Dr. Roland Pietsch

René Guénon, known in the Islamic world as Shaykh ´Abd al Wāḥid Yaḥyā (1886–1951), was one of the most important representatives of the Sophia perennis (Guénon 2001a: 77, Schuon 1979: 133–137) in the twentieth century.

His works are mainly concerned with a profound critique of the modern world from a metaphysical point of view, a renewed exposition of the immutable principles of universal metaphysics, the traditional sciences and finally symbolism.

The following paper presents at first the main elements of universal metaphysics. Then the relation between metaphysics and sciences will be demonstrated, whereas the difference between traditional and modern sciences will be examined. After that, follows a short presentation of some elements of traditional sciences of logic and mathematics.

Metaphysics

For explaining metaphysics, René Guénon^[1] told in his lecture at the University Sorbonne in 1925: “It should be made clear just what is meant by the word ‘metaphysics’, and all the more so since I have frequently had an opportunity to note that not everyone understands it in quite the same way. I think the best course to take in dealing with words that might give rise to ambiguity is to restore to them as much as possible their primal and etymological meaning. Now, according to its composition, the word ‘metaphysics’ means literally ‘beyond physics’, taking the word ‘physics’ in the accepted sense it was always used by the ancients, that is to say as ‘knowledge of nature’ in the widest sense. Physics is the study of all that pertains to the domain of nature; metaphysics, on the other hand, is the study of that which lies beyond nature” (Guénon 2001a: 88), and thus is supernatural.

René Guénon states that it is not possible to define metaphysics, “because to define is always to limit, and what is under consideration, in and of itself, is truly and absolutely limitless and thus cannot be confined to any formula or any system whatsoever”(Guénon 2004:89 f).Metaphysics can only be partially characterized for example, that it “is essentially the knowledge of the Universal, or the knowledge of principles belonging to the universal order, which moreover alone can validly lay claim to the name of principles” (ibid.: 71).

Thus the metaphysical knowledge differs radically from the other modes of human knowledge. This raises the question of which approach to metaphysics can be found.

Before Guénon answers, he states: “Metaphysics can only be studied metaphysically” (ibid.: 74). Basically, it is considered that metaphysical conceptions “can never be completely expressed, nor even imagined, since their essence is attainable by the pure and ‘formless’ intelligence alone; they vastly exceed all possible forms, especially the formulas in which language tries to enclose them, which are always inadequate and tend to restrict their scope and therefore distort them. These formulas, like all symbols, can only serve as a starting-point, a ‘support’ so to speak, which acts as an aid towards understanding that which in itself remains inexpressible; it is up to each man to try to conceive it according to the extent of their own intellectual powers, making good, in proportion to their success, the unavoidable deficiencies of formal and limited expression” (ibid.: 74 f).

The pure intellect and metaphysical knowledge

A very important aspect of metaphysics concerns the means of metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysical knowledge as a knowledge of the Universal doesn’t know the distinction between subject and object. When one also speaks of the means of attaining metaphysical knowledge, “it is evident that such means can only be one and the same thing as knowledge itself, in which subject and object are essentially unified” (ibid.: 75). It follows from this that the means in question is not a discursive faculty such as individual human reason. On the contrary, “metaphysical truths can only be conceived by the use of a faculty that does not belong to the individual order, and that, by reason of the immediate character of its operation, may be called ‘intuitive’” (ibid.: 75 f), but intuition not understood as the instinctive and vital faculty of some modern philosophers.