

Englische Zusammenfassungen der Beiträge (چکیده انگلیسی مقالات)

Harald Seubert outlines the philosophical concept of freedom from ancient times to Sartre. He systematically shows that freedom must be realized and shall not remain a mere concept. Yet, he assumes that outer freedom cannot be thought realistically without inner freedom: their core does not merely lie in the different systems of philosophy but also in the spirituality and mystic of world religions. Freedom is not a nameable feature, but a transcending movement. Salvation and redemption have essential reference to restored freedom. The significance of freedom is to maintain the originality of human actions and speech, at the same time it is a look from natality. Freedom has the role to give cultural and peacemaking power in the life and politics of each person.

In his article **Hans-Christian Günther** makes the western concept of freedom a subject of discussion. He shows the concept's evolvement from classical ancient times over Christianity, the 17th century to the Age of Enlightenment. This clearly demonstrates that freedom is closely related to the specific European concept of reason. Yet, it has neither been reflected upon that the concept of freedom reveals a specific in contrast to universal meaning, nor is reverberated that the definition of a human being connected to a universal valid definition of reason excludes individual freedom. The crux of the modern western concept of freedom is seen in the holding of a pseudo freedom regarding the Age of Enlightenment and neither reflects upon its specific conditions in the frame of European thinking nor upon its ineligibility in a modern world.

Regarding the latest discussions about human freedom, **Paul Richard Blum** suggests to take under consideration some authors of the Renaissance, which would help envision the underlying meaning of the referring questions. He doubts whether a human's will is not being destroyed by external factors, for example by God's providence or the determinism of nature. The point of view that human effort is contradictory to God's predestination, according to Blum, was strong during the Protestant Reformation in order to

emphasize God's omnipotence. Representatives of this thinking concept, according to Blum, are humanist Lorenzo Valla and theologian Martin Luther. They already found a predecessor in Francesco Petrarca, who had diagnosed freedom as a mere pursuit, which – like love – is never really realised. What remains is a 'freedom-as-if', the impulse to consider oneself as free. Compared to this, according to Blum, in reference to politician Coluccio Salutati and Neoplatonist Marsilio Ficino a concept of God can convey a strategy to make human freedom thinkable and even realizable. Because of man being God's image he acts likewise spontaneous as God, but not as complete. God is the criterion for how far a human being can go towards freedom.

Mohammad Ghorbanpour Delavar addresses the structural sense of freedom in Islam. He believes that freedom is a sacred right of every human and seen from the Islamic perspective a principle. De facto all revealed religions vouched for freedom and protected it as such and rejected every form of physical and psychological slavery. 'Islam' as the last revealed religion also always emphasizes and vouches for freedom. The researcher shows that what the 'International Universal Declaration of Human Rights' and other western sources reveal about freedom is more complete in Islamic sources and finds more attention here. With reference to sources, texts and islamic studies he deepens and proves this claim. He also explains the status of the dignity and sublimity of a human being.

Mohsen Mahdipour scrutinizes in this article the point of view of freedom from Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Beheshti. Freedom of thinking according to Beheshti is interrelated with the ability of a person to create his own destiny. Mahdipour sees man seeking freedom by nature. If it is taken from him, he loses his identity. He regards ignorance as a profound obstacle of social freedom and believes that society's freedom cannot be attained only by freedom of opinion. Rather required are people with knowledge, as well as social facilities that promote freedom. Hence, on the one hand criticism towards the government should be allowed, and on the other hand certain restrictions regarding freedom should be made. He divides social freedom in three categories: religious freedom, freedom of opinion and electoral freedom. Each of these freedom concepts bare restrictions. The religious freedom is restricted when one's own freedom or the freedom of faith

of the other is restricted. Freedom of opinion finds its borders where the freedom rights of the other are broken.

Reza Haghighi discusses the concept of 'freedom' in Morteza Motahari's thought. To Motahari freedom is one among the highest of human values. Though he also outlines arguments for negative effects of freedom, he specially dedicates himself to the positive factors in the areas of culture, upbringing and education. According to Haghighi, Motahari does not regard freedom as a goal, and not as 'perfect ultima', but as 'fully organic'. Reason and meaning are not the freedom from causes, because firstly such a freedom were not an absolute feature, secondly freedom moves closer towards forcefulness under the assumption that it has no relation for discretion. From an anthropological point of view a human being to Motahari seems to be a composition from two 'I's, with a human and an animalic side. Spiritual freedom means retention of the 'true self' towards the 'self'-knowing human being. In the social range a human enjoys mainly political freedom, though these cannot, according to Haghighi, be implemented reasonably without spirituality.