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## **Ontological Innovations of the Inventive Philosopher Āqā**

**‘Alī Modarres Ṭehrānī<sup>1</sup>**

**(A Case Study in the Fundamentality of Existence)**

### **Introduction**

Ontological investigations are among the most brilliant studies in Islamic philosophy and the most serious steps taken in the path of intellectuality. Muslim philosophers have added many related issues to the rational thought. The great development of divine philosophy respecting ontology is mainly due to the fundamental innovations of Ṣadro’l-Mote‘allehīn Shīrāzī (979-1050 AH). The famous Sage of Shiraz was the first to make existence the axis of philosophy, and thus all philosophical issues were reorganized and resolved on this principle. The Transcendent Philosophy of Mollā Ṣadrā is the outcome of this new view to existence.

Among the different ontological issues, two are of more importance: the fundamentality of existence (*iṣālatu’l-wuğūd*) and the gradualness of existence. However, the most important problem of ontology, even the

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<sup>1</sup> Translated from Persian into English by Dr. Fāzel Asadi Amjad and Dr. Mehdi Dasht Bozorgi.

most important philosophical problem in general, is the problem of the fundamentality of existence, so that other issues are considered as either introductory to it or among its outcomes or its ramifications. The champion of this issue or the person who for the first time introduced it as an independent and fundamental philosophical problem and presented several arguments in its substantiation was Şadro'l-Mote'allehīn Shīrāzī (Mollā Şadrā). The main sources of the fundamentality of existence in the works of Mollā Şadrā are *Al-mašā'ir* (*Metaphysical Penetrations*)<sup>1</sup>, *Asfār*<sup>2</sup>, and *Al-masā'ilu'l-qudsiyya* (*Spiritual Questions*)<sup>3</sup>.

After a detailed discussion on the fundamentality of existence, Mollā Şadrā writes: "We have elaborated sufficiently concerning this issue. However what is left unsaid is more than what is said, for this issue is very lofty, valuable and exceedingly complicated. It is one of the most important and the most deserving of purposes, which has to be acquired through much effort.

*If these tears flow in love of other than Leila  
Then, they are lost tears."*<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, "we are sure that no matter how hard we try in this concern, our effort would still not be much".<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, despite its exceeding importance, "this issue has been neither investigated as it should be nor discussed properly. You will see many teachers of philosophy teach this issue by referring to different books and discuss it over years, but they do not know neither its purpose nor the outcomes expected from its two aspects".<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, the fundamentality of existence still has to be studied, discussed and probed from different points of view.

The greatness of Mollā Şadrā and the depth of the issues he discussed were such that now, four centuries after his death, the centres of Transcendent Philosophy are still analysing, studying and discussing his views, and concerning most issues they have nothing new to say besides

what Mollā Ṣadrā had said already. In general, there have been few new discourses, innovative ideas, new evidence or novel studies after Mollā Ṣadrā. Most of the followers of Transcendent Philosophy have been only commentators on Mollā Ṣadrā and skilful transmitters of Transcendent Philosophy. Among post-Mollā Ṣadrā philosophers, Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, the son of Mollā 'Abdollāh Modarres Zonūzī (1234-1307 AH), is a philosopher, who besides interpreting and explicating the views of Mollā Ṣadrā, reconsidered the fundamental principles, and concerning several philosophical issues offered new remarks and novel arguments, so much that he was aptly called the “founder philosopher” in his own era. Despite the much importance of this divine theosopher’s philosophical innovations, the innovative views of the founder philosopher are less known and have scarcely been the subject of analysis, mainly because most of his works are so far left unpublished and even those published works are now out of print.

The emphasis of this article is on the innovations of Āqā 'Alī respecting the fundamentality of existence and the assessment of the value and significance of these innovations. The admirable efforts of Āqā 'Alī concerning the fundamentality of existence focus on presenting a logical form of Mollā Ṣadrā’s thought. The innovations of this original philosopher, on the other hand, could not be understood except on the basis of Ṣadrian formidable foundations.

Because of the special conditions in which this article was written, I hope scholars and philosophers will oblige me with reminding me of any defect they may find in it. It should be noted, however, that the inaccessibility of the works of most philosophers in the interval following Mollā Ṣadrā and ending in Āqā 'Alī is one of the causes of the limitation of this and other similar researches.

This article is arranged in two sections. In the first section, we deal with the general and rudimentary issues of the fundamentality of existence from the point of view of Āqā 'Alī. In the second section we discuss the novel arguments offered by the founder philosopher concerning the fundamentality of existence.

### Rudimentary and General Points

In this section, three issues have been discussed. First, an explication is given on the point of problematic concerning the fundamentality of existence. Second, an answer is given to the following question: “Is not the contention among the proponents of the fundamentality of existence and the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness (quiddity, *māhiyya*) a verbal one?” Third, the views of Āqā ‘Alī concerning the speculative or evident nature of the issue on the fundamentality of existence is briefly discussed.

#### Explaining the Problematic Concerning the Fundamentality of Existence

Āqā ‘Alī Modarres Tehrānī begins his answer to the second question of *Badāyī‘u’l-ḥikam* as follows:

Dispute and judgment: The disagreement they showed on the fundamentality of existence or whatness concerned two subjects. First, would the concept of existence, without exerting the intellect and the relation of that concept to one of whatnesses, be conceivable as an instance unrelated to the origin of concepts and whatnesses? Or rather, its instance is confined to the portion produced by the intellect through the relation of that concept to one of whatnesses?

The researchers among theologians and peripatetic philosophers and divine philosophers believe that it has real instance and is not limited to a portion produced from the relation of the concept of existence to one of whatnesses.

All theologians believe that in all existents, and Shayḥu’l-Ishrāq (Sohravardī), his followers and some other eminent scholars also believe that in every thing that possesses whatness, existence has no instance other than the aforementioned portion.

Second, having proved that existence has a real instance, the fundamentality and primacy of the being and existence of the real instance of existence would be established, and whatness in its existence would be

dependent on it, or whatness has the primacy and fundamentality in reality, and existence would be dependent on it.

The peripatetic and divine philosophers believe that existence is fundamental and original (*aṣīl*) but the verifiers among theologians assume that whatness is original and fundamental. Therefore, the meaning of the fundamentality of existence in the first problem is that the concept of existence has originality and reality, and a real instance which is not conceptual in origin and its existence is not confined to the portion which is produced through the relation of the concept of existence to one of whatnesses, and that portion is also of conceptual origin.

The meaning of *iṣālat* (fundamentality, principality) in the second problem would be that the real instance of existence, essentially and without adding any aspect of the conditioned aspects is the instance and manifestation of the concept of existence, and if that instance belonged to a whatness, that whatness, dependent on and because of it, would be the instance of the concept of existence.<sup>7</sup>

Āqā 'Alī in the passage cited above has discussed the problematic respecting the fundamentality of existence in relation to two subjects. Concerning the first subject, he begins the discussion with the concept of existence rather than the external existent. The main question in the first contention is that whether the concept of existence, without the deliberation of the intellect and without relation to different whatnesses, has real instances, or it has no real instances, and it is by the deliberation of the intellect and by relation of the absolute concept of existence to different whatnesses, the respectival intellectual portions as instances of existence are produced. In answer to this question, there are three philosophical views. The first view is based on the fundamentality of existence in the sense that the concept of existence has real and true instances. This is the view of divine philosophers, peripatetic philosophers and the verifiers among theologians. The second view is that the concept of existence has absolutely no real instances, either in the Necessary Being or in the contingent. On its relation to whatnesses, the concept of existence comes to possess intellectual conceptual portions,

which, of course, without the deliberation of the intellect will have no reality whatsoever. This is the view of almost all theologians. The third view is that the concept of existence in all that possesses whatness, that is, material contingents, has no real instances, and it is only through deliberation of the intellect and relation to whatnesses that it will have intellectual respectival portions, conceptual in origin; however, the concept of existence has true and real instances in the soul and in the Necessary Being. This is the view of Shayḥu'l-Ishrāq, illuminationist philosophers, and some other eminent scholars.

The second standpoint is discussed where existence is already proved to be possessed with real instances; in other words, where in the first standpoint the fundamentality of existence has been adopted. The main question in the second contention is this: Is the real instance of existence without adding a conditioned aspect, that is, primarily and essentially, the instance and manifestation of the concept of existence, or is that real instance, that of whatness, and through its mediation in its occurrence and dependence on whatness will it be the instance of existence? In answer to this question, the first view is that of divine philosophers and the peripatetic who believe in the fundamentality of existence, that is, the real instance of existence primarily and essentially and without any conditioned aspect is the instance and manifestation of existence. The second is the view of the verifying theologians who believe in the fundamentality of whatness, namely, the real instance in company with the conditioned aspect is the instance of the concept of existence. And without accepting this aspect, it would be primarily and essentially the instance and manifestation of whatness. In the second contention, the discussion begins with the real instance of existence, that is the existent; and the question can be put simply as whether this existent primarily and essentially is the instance of the concept of existence or whatness. The illuminationist philosophers have no contribution to the latter contention.

What is explained in the works of Mollā Ṣadrā and other transcendent philosophers like Sabzevārī, the Sage<sup>8</sup> is based on the second contention, that is, the discussion starts with the external reality, the existent,

and it is asked: Which of the two concepts of existence and whatness does this external reality represent? Is it primarily and essentially, that is, without the mediation in its occurrence and without any conditioned aspect, the instance of the concept of existence and secondly and accidentally the instance of whatness, or is it the contrary? In any case, besides this picture no other picture of the contention and disputation between the believers in the fundamentality of existence and the believers in the fundamentality of whatness has been offered in the books written on Transcendent Philosophy, and the dual disputing has never been depicted as Āqā 'Alī has done it.

The first contention focuses on the dispute among the philosophers and theologians before the advent of Transcendent Philosophy, that is, after accepting the intellectual duality of existence and whatness, and after admitting the external existent in the external reality: Is existence an accident of whatness or not? In other words, does the concept of existence have real instance, or does it have no real instance and it is only through the deliberation of the intellect and by relation to whatness that it gains a respectival conceptual portion? Although in the first contention, concerning whether whatness has reality or not, in case of accepting the first view, namely, accepting the real instance of existence, has not been discussed, nevertheless this dispute is very close to that which is discussed in the works of Shayḥu'l-Ishrāq<sup>9</sup> and also the works of theologians such as Mīr Seyyed Sharīf Ḡoḡānī in his commentary on *Al-mawāqif*, on the subject of negating the objective accident of existence to whatness.

If we consider the above two contentions to be historically consecutive, that is, until the tenth century only the first contention was discussed in intellectual circles<sup>10</sup> (and its name was not the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness or the contrary), and from the eleventh century A.H., the era of Mīr Dāmād and Mollā Ṣadrā, the second contention became dominant (and its name is precisely the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness or the contrary), this would be a very convincing explication of the dispute and in accordance with the scientific evidence. For in the works of the illumi-

nationist philosophers, the respectivalness of existence and the fundamentality of whatness have been never discussed in the way it is discussed in the Transcendent Philosophy. Sohrevardī's debate, for example, only negates the accidentence of existence to whatness in the external reality. The compatibility of Sohrevardī's principles with the fundamentality of whatness and the respectivalness of existence should not be regarded as his acceptance of this view. Looked at from this vantage point, the distinction made between the two contentions can be considered as the ingenuity and one of the philosophical subtleties of Āqā 'Alī Modarres.

In his *Risāla fī mabāḥiṭu'l-ḥaml* (Treatise on the Issues of Predication), Āqā 'Alī has alluded to this scientific distinction in another way:

This is based on the fortified true approach concerning existence; that is, existence has real instances, which is the meaning of the fundamentality of existence in respect of conception. However, according to the false absurd approach that is followed by a group of theologians and some known as the illuminationists, existence has respectival instances. The respectival intellectual portions called instances of existence are produced, simply by the deliberation of the intellect and through relation of the concept of the absolute existence to different whatnesses ... Hence the intelligent and the wise can discern the fundamentality of existence in establishment and making the difference ... Therefore, there should be another origin beyond the origin of whatnesses, which in itself is neither existent nor nonexistent, nor determined nor undetermined, nor general nor specific, nor differentiated nor undifferentiated ...<sup>11</sup>

Here Āqā 'Alī speaks of two kinds of fundamentality of existence: one is the fundamentality of existence in conception and the other is the fundamentality of existence in establishment and making. The former contention is the first contention cited in the quotation from *Badāyi'*, and the latter contention can also be seen as corresponding with the second problematic already discussed.

In his *Risāla fī wuḡūdi 'r-rābiṭ* (Treatise on Relational Existence), Āqā 'Alī refers to this dispute in another way:

Existence has reality in the external, independent from the respectival portions; this is the view of the fundamentality of existence according to the first meaning. In other words, unlike those who believe that the instances of existence are confined to the respectival portions, existence in reality has real instances and is diversified according to its diverse subjects ... Therefore, existence has primacy over whatness and does exist in itself ... And this is the fundamentality of existence according to the second view in contradistinction to the view of those who believe existence has instances and is diversified according to its diverse subjects, but in its establishment is dependent on whatness.<sup>12</sup>

However, in Āqā 'Alī's innovative explication of the dispute over the fundamentality of existence and the separation of the two contentions, there are some ambiguous points to which we refer here.

First, the separation of these two contentions is debatable. If we suppose the second contention as based on the acceptance of the real instances of existence, then there would be no place for discussing its second part. In other words, the two parts of the second contention can be discussed when we acknowledge the real existent rather than the real instances of existence. There is much difference between the real instances of existence and the real existent. On the other hand, if we suppose the second contention as based on the acceptance of the existent rather than the real instances of existence, there would be no technical difference between the first and the second problematics. The difference would be nominal and formal only; that is, in the first problematic we begin with the concept of existence while in the second one we begin with the reality of the existent, and this would not be a distinguishing difference between the two problematics. Meanwhile, Āqā 'Alī himself has not used the difference between these two problematics at all. In other words, he has not imagined any scientific use for these two problematics to say if it is useful or not.

Second, regarding the two mentioned contentions if we accept the historical justification of being consecutive, then, on one hand, we would not be able to call the first problematic the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness; rather, it would be more appropriate to call it the negation of the accident of existence to whatness, or a similar name. On the other hand, in the second one and on certain historical evidence, the peripatetics and theologians would not be accepted as believers either in the fundamentality of existence or whatness. Rather the two groups of divine philosophers, namely Mīr Dāmād as an advocate of the fundamentality of whatness and Mollā Ṣadrā as a believer in the fundamentality of existence, would be mentioned. Indeed, the second problematic has never been discussed in Peripatetic Philosophy or in the works of theologians.

Third, calling the first problematic “the fundamentality of existence in conception” – as has been done in *Treatise on the Issues of Predication* – is also debatable.

The issue of the fundamentality of existence, in all its meanings, is one of confirmation and realization. Looking closely into this issue gives this confirmation that this problem has only one point of contention and that is the fundamentality of existence in position of reality. The first dispute, especially as is discussed in *Treatise on the Relational Existence*, in comparison with the belief in the respectival portions (the view opposite to that of the fundamentality of existence) has no scientific value, and can be studied only in the history of philosophy. However, Āqā ‘Alī in bringing creation (*ḡa’l*) in the same category of reality can be justified, for whether the created (*maḡ’ūl*) is existence or whatness, or it is the characterization of whatness to existence, would not be a new kind of the fundamentality of existence, though the differentiation they made between the fundamentality of existence in the position of reality and the fundamentality of existence in the state of creation (*ḡa’l*) which is emphasized by the common opinion, is debatable. The problem of creation (*ḡa’l*) is not separate from the problem of causality; rather, it is one of its ramifications and many of those who advocate the subject of creation (*ḡa’l*) are unknown or imaginary persons. Those who

believe in the fundamentality of existence, in the issue of creation (*ḡa'l*) and causality have no other choice than accepting the createdness (*maḡ'ūliyyat*) of existence, and those who believe in the createdness (*maḡ'ūliyyat*) of whatness, in the issue of causality have no other option than admitting the fundamentality of whatness. The problem of separating between the fundamentality of existence in the position of reality and the fundamentality of existence in the state of creation (*ḡa'l*) is not applicable to Āqā 'Alī, though this problem can be seen in the works of Mollā Ṣadrā.

Moreover, in some of the works of contemporary teachers of philosophy the distinction made in *Badāyi'* between the two contentions is mentioned without giving the name of the sources and no explanation or convincing defence of it has been given, nor any of the problems which so far have been briefly mentioned have been referred to.<sup>13</sup>

#### **The Dispute between the Believers in the Fundamentality of Existence and the Fundamentality of Whatness Is not Verbal**

In his commentary on *Al-mashā'ir* Mollā Aḥmad Ardakānī assumes that the dispute between the believers in the fundamentality of existence and the believers in the fundamentality of whatness is only verbal. He believes that ... because the view of the respectivalness of existence and the fundamentality and createdness of whatness is absurd and void, it would be much appropriate to bring together these two views and say: By saying that existence is not created and is respectival, the advocates of this view intend the very abstract concept of existence which is one of the secondary intelligibles. This is what is understood by the remarks of the believers in the fundamentality of existence, as Imām Faḥr Rāzī has understood this and asked that how a relational abstract thing in relation to the True Necessary Exalted Being can be essentially an independent thing and the origin of the independence and existence of all beings, and at the same time be in need of no cause and is identified by itself. On the other hand, the intention of those who believe in the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness is a

thing beyond the natural universal whatness as such. For whatness in this level cannot be created. Therefore, what the eminent scholars meant by whatness is something beyond the evident general existence, that is, the essence (*dāt*) of a thing available and existing in the external, and the intention of those who believe in the createdness of existence is surely not a respectival abstract thing; that which is understood by the believers in the fundamentality of existence to be created, for the verifiers believing in the fundamentality of whatness, is created, too. Therefore, their dispute is verbal. I believe this justification for people of sound nature is undeniable.<sup>14</sup>

In his commentary on *Ash-shawāhidu'r-rubūbiyya* (Divine Witnesses), evidently in reference to the views of Mollā Aḥmad Ardakānī Shīrāzī, Āqā 'Alī refers to the likelihood of the verbal dispute among the believers in the fundamentality of existence or whatness, but only to criticize and reject the view:

... So it is somehow interpreted that the dispute between the believers in the fundamentality of existence and the believers in the fundamentality of whatness is verbal. The first group believes that besides this general concept and its relation to whatnesses, existence has its own real instances. However, these real instances are called whatnesses by the second group, those who deny that existence has any instances other than this abstract general concept and its portions.

But this approximation is not acceptable. For there is difference between what the first group knows as real and calls it existence and what the second group knows as real and calls it whatness. The instances of whatness such as man or horse are essentially different and are separated from each other; they cannot be predicated on or related to each other. Attributing causation, priority or intensity to some and to others is only preponderance without there being a preponderant. However, the realities of the concept of existence are totally related to each other, and their difference is caused by their separation rather than their attributes. Therefore, there is no escape from accepting the fundamentality of existence.<sup>15</sup>

Although at first the dispute between the two groups concerning the question of the fundamentality of existence looks to be verbal – though the disagreement is over whether the external reality is primarily and essentially the instances of the concept of existence or whatness – this should not lead us to call the dispute verbal, for the issue is more complicated than one of calling the external reality existence or whatness. The question is whether this external existent manifests and is the instance of existence or whatness. Simply by calling what the first group calls “the reality of existence” whatness, or calling what the second group calls “the realized whatness” existence the question would not be solved and the dispute would not be ended. The dispute is scientific and deeply rooted; accepting one of the two views would really change the whole countenance of philosophy. Therefore, Āqā 'Alī has every right to assume the dispute to be intellectual and very profound. Anyway, despite the clarity of the problem in question, it is necessary to discuss it in books of philosophy. Nevertheless this issue has been scarcely discussed in such books.

#### **The Question of the Fundamentality of Existence is Necessary or almost Necessary**

From the point of view of the original philosopher, if the point of contention is correctly stated, the fundamentality of existence would be inevitable or almost inevitable. Following the above mentioned passage in *Badāyi'u'l-hikam* he writes:

[It would be clear enough] if the subject of each question is restricted to the subject appropriate to that question, and if each object is understood by its true qualifying aspect, and also, concerning the predicate and the attribute, i.e., bearing the title of predicate by the subject in that question and the verification of the attribute for the qualified subject becomes necessary and evident. For there is no need for evidence to prove theoretical issues except for verifying the reason a subject becomes qualified by a predicate. We should rather conceive the form of the dispute and the point of the contention in such a way that by only drawing

up the form of the dispute the truth of that which is true – on both sides of the dispute – becomes inevitable or almost inevitable. So, in a general way that includes both disputes we say ...<sup>16</sup>

It is a general rule that if the conceptual and assertive principles of the philosophical questions are put down correctly, most of the questions become evident or nearly evident. Therefore, the problem with most philosophical discussions should be found in the stage of conceptualization. This is true also about the issue of the fundamentality of existence, in the sense that if the point of contention is well understood, it becomes evident or almost evident rather than theoretical. In this case the established arguments will serve only as warning and evidence rather than comprehensive philosophical proofs. Looking at most of the arguments established in respect of this issue, we will confirm that they are only admonitions and are the analysis of the same conceptual and assertive principles of the problem. The innovative arguments of Āqā ‘Alī himself are no exception. However, it should be noted that understanding the issues considered by the two sides of the contention as evident requires much consideration as these issues are usually more complicated theoretical problems and often include axioms on which the two different philosophical systems are founded. It is important to look for harmony and consistency among the components of the philosophical systems allegedly founded on such axioms, otherwise claiming evidence in philosophical problems is not new.

### **Arguments on the Fundamentality of Existence**

In his book *Al-asfār*, the founder of the fundamentality of existence, Mollā Ṣadrā, establishes two arguments on his theory, but in *Al-mashā‘ir* (Metaphysical Penetrations) which compared to his other works is more extensive, he presents eight arguments on this question. The philosopher Sabzevārī, an expert in explaining and interpreting the Ṣadrian philosophy, has put in verse six of Mollā Ṣadrā’s arguments on the fundamentality of existence established in his different works, especially *Al-mashā‘ir*. These six arguments do not possess the same scien-

tific importance. The arguments put down on the issues of the fundamentality of existence after Mollā Ṣadrā are exactly those discussed by Mollā Ṣadrā himself. In his various works, Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī had always the question of the fundamentality of existence in mind and has established many arguments on the question. The first group of these arguments constitutes an explication of the proofs presented by Mollā Ṣadrā himself; the second group includes arguments that cannot be seen in the works of Mollā Ṣadrā or other students of Transcendent Philosophy. Āqā 'Alī has presented some of the arguments of the latter group in his innovative way. In what follows we refer to four of the most important innovative arguments of the original philosopher on the fundamentality of existence.

#### *A) The First Argument*

In his *Badāyī'u'l-ḥikam* and after the aforementioned statements, Āqā 'Alī offers the following argument as “a firmly-founded explanation”. In its separated premises the argument will be as follows:

**[The First Premise]** What essentially drives away non-existence and is essentially and by its nature, is opposite to non-being and voidness and is considered an instance on the basis of intellectual and philosophical truth and without the admixture of philosophical and intellectual metaphor, that is, in essence and not in accident and without needing an intermediary in its occurrence, and without being added to any of the conditioned aspects is it of the origin of concepts and of the genus of the conceptual objectivity, or is it a thing totally different from the origin of concepts and its objectivity is other than the conceptual objectivity?

**[The Second Premise]** Since evidently every thing of the origin of concepts by itself does not drive away non-existence and is not essentially contradictory with non-existence or opposite to voidness, as in itself it is also not opposite to existence and being, it would be granted then by both sides of the dispute that it is evident for the sound intellect and wholesome taste that whatness in its essence is nothing other than

itself, namely the origin of whatness and conception are not essentially realized things other than essence and the essential which are conceptual in origin. Therefore, any whatness and concept in their nature would be devoid of existence or non-existence. The intellect would necessarily judge that whatnesses in themselves and in their nature are not contradictory with non-existence, or opposite to or driving away voidness and non-being.

**[The Third Premise]** Therefore, if any whatness outside or inside the mind can drive away non-existence and is opposite to and contradictory with non-being and voidness, this repulsion, opposition, and contradiction then would not be essential to it; and because they are not in its nature, they would be in it by accident and by way of dependence.

**[The Fourth Premise]** On the other hand, it is presupposed by the intellect that every accidental should be led to an essential thing, otherwise its existence would be impossible. Therefore, beyond the origin of whatness and concept, there should be another origin essentially qualified with the contradiction, opposition, and exclusion.

**[The Fifth Premise]** That origin necessarily should not be non-existence or non-being, for nothing in its essence is contradictory with or opposite to or driving away its essence.

**[The Sixth Premise]** Therefore, that origin would be the origin of existence and would be restricted to the origin of existence, because the intellect necessarily and intuitively and without the trouble of establishing proofs, but only through complete induction of the intelligible and its own knowledge, acknowledges that its intelligible is restricted to existence and non-existence, the former essentially drives away non-existence and the latter essentially is in contradiction with existence. And what in its nature is devoid of these two is neither existence nor non-existence in this level, though in reality because of the realisation or non-realisation of the complete cause is necessarily qualified by one of them.

**[Conclusion]** Therefore, it becomes clear that by a little reflection intellect would verify that existence does exist essentially, and absolute non-

existence qua non-existence cannot exist. Because in its nature it is devoid of existence, whatness may indeed be qualified by existence or non-existence; it could be qualified by existence or non-existence only by accident. Therefore, after understanding the point of the contention as it is, the intellect inevitably or almost inevitably would acknowledge the fundamentality and originality of existence, and the dependence of all other than existence, such as non-existence and whatness, on it in their existence, if they exist.<sup>17</sup>

In short, this argument could be explained as follows: Concept and whatness in themselves do not drive away non-existence. If any whatness inside or outside the mind drives away non-existence, this exclusion is not essential due to its nature; rather, it is accidental and is subservient. Logically speaking, every accidental should lead to an essential, and this essential thing should not be non-existence. For non-existence does not essentially drive away non-existence. Other than existence nothing can drive away non-existence.

Some of the premises of this argument are shared by the first argument of *Al-asfār*, the first argument of *Al-mashā'ir* and the fifth argument of the *Manzūma* ("How existence is not fundamental and original while all things leave the state of indifference towards existence or non-existence through it and come into reality?"). Perhaps because of this sharing, some have understood this argument as only a new version of these arguments. However, reflection on the content of these arguments would show that despite the proximity of these four arguments, the argument in question is an independent one and must be considered as a separate argument. Even if we consider it a new version of those arguments, its value would be unquestionable, to the extent that it can be regarded as the strongest argument ever presented on the fundamentality of existence.

Seventy years after the presentation of this argument, the author of *The Philosophy of Avicenna* (*Hekmat-e Bū 'Alī Sīnā*), Ḥā'erī Māzandarānī a believer in the fundamentality of whatness, wrote a treatise titled *The Consignment of Wisdoms Disclosing the Deceits of Badāyī'u'l-ḥikam* to

refute it.<sup>18</sup> Reading this treatise shows that despite the much endeavour of its honoured author, his eminence in defending the fundamentality of whatness and the respectivalness of existence has not been successful either in establishing evidence for his claims or refuting the arguments of his opponent, or interpreting the views of prominent philosophers, especially Avicenna. In the treatise grave philosophical errors can be seen, and analysing and discussing them would need a separate treatise. To save the time I would refrain from citing and criticizing all its points, and would suffice to quote two points as examples. The honourable protestor writes: "Real existence cannot be created and if it has instance in the entified reality, it would be necessary by itself, not by another."<sup>19</sup> It is clear that he confounds here the conditioned aspect and the causal aspect. In another place he says:

The concept of existence or the aspect of refusing non-existence is a respectival concept and is dependent on creation. And as creation belongs to whatness, it makes that whatness, which so far was indifferent to either existence or non-existence, refuse non-existence [3].

Indeed, how can refusing non-existence be both a respectival concept and at the same time dependent on creation? If refusing non-existence is respectival, what is real then? Second, what has the creator of whatness, which in its nature is indifferent to both existence and non-existence, given to it other than existence to make it refuse non-existence? If all believers in the fundamentality of whatness present similar arguments to those offered in *The Consignment of Wisdoms Disclosing the Deceits of Badāyī'u'l-ḥikam* then the fundamentality of whatness would be a weak baseless view rising from carelessness in philosophical principles.

Because some of the contemporary students of philosophy have criticized the above-mentioned treatise and highlighted its many errors [1], there is no need for further elaboration here.

#### *B) The Second Argument*

In continuation of the above mentioned points of *Badāyī'u'l-ḥikam*, the founder philosopher presents a group of new arguments on the funda-

mentality of existence under the title *Ramified Acquisition and Acquired Ramification*, which is important from two points. First, these are new arguments on the fundamentality of existence, and second, besides their demonstrative value, they contain new issues in ontological studies, which in knowing the precepts of whatness are of primal importance. Because this section is too long, we quote in what follows the remarks of Āqā 'Alī, summarizing somehow and correcting some of his expressions:

1. Every affirmative concept in being affirmative that exists outside the level of the essence of whatness and is really settled, that is, it can be qualified with secondary predication, and its truth and occurrence need an intermediary is an evidence that the concept of existence has an instance in reality, and that instance exists without intellectual deliberation or consideration but in itself, and in its nature and its whole essence is the instance of that affirmative concept, and that whatness is accidentally the instances of that concept. For each accidental necessarily leads to that which is essential, and, therefore, that intermediary would be either essentially the instance of that affirmative concept or it would end in a thing that essentially would be its instance. On the other hand, the origin of non-existence qua non-existence cannot be the essential instance of affirmative concepts, for either the aspect of non-existence qua non-existence will turn into an aspect of the affirmative, or that affirmative concept in being affirmative will turn into a non-existent concept, and both these reversals are impossible. Moreover, no whatness in itself and in whole essence can be the instance of another whatness and, therefore, that intermediary will necessarily be of the origin of existence.
2. The truth and applicability of the concept of existence on whatness in accidental application are an instance on the fundamentality of existence, that is, the concept of existence has an instance that exists in itself and that whatness exists by accident. In other words, the concept of existence has instance in reality without the deliberation of the intellect, and that instance is the extension of

and represents that affirmative concept in itself and without taking into consideration any of the conditioned aspect and with no need of an intermediary in its occurrence. Among these affirmative concepts is the concept of existent whose truth and applicability on whatever is of the origin of concept and whatness incidental. So, in reality it is a thing which in itself and in the level of its essence and in the whole essence necessarily and intellectually is the instance of the concept of existent. For if in only a part of the essence it is essentially the instance of the existent, that part which is not essentially the instance of the existent would be of the origin of whatness or non-existence. This accident should also lead to that which is essential in nature.

3. The applicability of the concept of maker (*ḡā'il*) on some whatnesses is an argument that existence in being maker is original and fundamental. Likewise, the applicability of being made on whatnesses is a proof that existence in being made is fundamental. Therefore, the applicability of the concept of maker on whatness is incidental and on existence is essential.
4. Likewise are accidents known as the accidents of existential truths such as knowledge, power, and life, which exist in all living things and are not incompatible with the necessity of existence. (Accidents which are incompatible with the necessity of existence are the origin of contingency, in the sense of being preceded by others, existential possibility, causedness, formal causality, relational unity.) The truth and applicability of the accidents of existential truths to whatnesses are an argument that in reality existence has an instance which is the extension of those accidents essentially, and whatness is its instance by accident.
5. What essentially is the instance of an object, the origin of that object in reality is its very essence and is equal to its essence, as the concept of blackness means an object that is black and an essence which has blackness. It is applicable to the body by accident, and because blackness is dependent on it, it will be its in-

stance. In this level of the body's existence qua body's existence, blackness will have blackness essentially and according to that rank blackness will be its permanent quality. Similarly, particularity, in the sense of denying and rejecting the truth and applicability to many others, is applicable to whatness incidentally, because it is beyond the essence of whatness. These affairs are counted an argument on the fundamentality of existence. Because, as an example, the concept of existence like other concepts does not reject the truth and applicability to many.

6. Conclusion: In the truth and applicability of the affirmative concepts on whatnesses accidentally and in a rank beyond the level of the essences of those whatnesses, the origin of abstracting that concept is something outside the essence of those whatnesses, and therefore the origin of its extraction is not of the origin of whatness, for no whatness can be the origin of the extraction of a concept that is applicable to it by accident. Nor is its origin non-existing, for the origin of non-existence has no truth except pure voidness.
7. Corollary: This is why divine theosophers have stated that the affirmative concepts qua affirmative concepts could not be extracted from non-existent aspects, and non-existent or negative concepts qua non-existent concepts are not taken from existential aspects, otherwise non-existent aspects would turn into existential aspects, or affirmative concepts would return to negative aspects, or existential qualities would return to non-existent qualities, or negative and non-existent concepts would turn to affirmative concepts, while all these reversals are against our assumptions.
8. Rather, each affirmative concept proved to belong to a whatness and is predicated to it incidentally and its predication needs no intermediary in being, its subsistence and predication on that whatness is an argument that in reality existence has an instance without the deliberation of an observer and without its relation to

whatness. For it became clear that the origin of non-existence qua non-existence and the origin of whatness cannot be described as an intermediary in its being (which is not free from necessitating or bringing in tail the non-existing). Therefore, that intermediary is of the origin of existence, namely, it is a thing that is essentially in contradiction with non-existence and drives it away.

9. The concomitants of whatness that are necessitated by whatness in a rank subsequent to that of the identity of whatness are believed by most scholars to be required essentially by those whatnesses; however, this is not true. For whatness in the rank of essence has only the essential and the concept of requiring the concomitant cannot be extraced from the nature of the essence of whatness itself, otherwise the concept of requiring the concomitant should be in the rank of that essence; and the truth of that whatness, for example the concept of four, exactly entails the concept of evenness, and this meaning is against our assumptions and is an impossible reversal. Therefore, whatness in the predication of concomitant precedence over it needs an intermediary for its being. That intermediary necessarily would not be of the origin of non-existence or whatness. For the origin of non-existence qua non-existence is absolutely void and the state of whatness in this sense is one and the same. Therefore, that intermediary is of the origin of existence. And if we accept the intermediation of existence in the predication of the concomitant of whatness, existence would be the intermediary of the occurrence and would follow necessarily while whatness would follow in dependence to it.
10. Whatness in intuiting its essential qualities (by the way of whitish establishment) needs existence to be its intermediary for realization. For the realization of whatness by whitish establishment is dependent on the reality of existence, though intellect in the vessel of deliberation, analysis, separation and extraction abstracts whatness from existence and considers it without the covering of existence. For taking off the cover of existence in the vessel of deliberation is the very mixing with existence. The deliberation

of the intellect is a kind of perception and perception itself is one of the accidents of existence, and the accidents of existence are the very existence according to the entified reality.

11. In compound whatnesses the general form confined to the intellect and the unified form of the parts in the external are arguments on the fundamentality of existence, namely it has a real instance. For the origin of whatnesses and concepts are essentially different, distinct and dispersed due to their separation. Therefore, no concept can be applied as a gatherer of other concepts. Then, if a concept in the mind is considered in a general way, the intellect by its analytical power can divide it into its constituent concepts, such as the concept "limited" that the intellect after considering the limiting parts in detail comes to it and reflects on it in a general way and then can divide it into the limiting parts. Also, whatness in the external can exist as a united form like the simple external things such as blackness or even external compounds such as ruby which contain the species denominator and the typical differentia. These things are arguments that existence has an instance in reality, otherwise, namely if it does not have a real instance containing all distinguishing parts in a general way in the mind and the essential parts in a unified way in the external, no defined thing would have a general form in the mind, nor compound things in the external would have a unified form, and even the disintegration of the autonomy of the elements and their admixture and their admitting the compound unifying form to produce a true compound and the transformation of the different qualities of elements into one temperamental quality would be impossible without the real instance of existence. For whatness itself cannot have the direction of unity and plurality.
12. Conclusion: In short, if you look at things with intellectual verification and philosophical precision, the existence of the whatish essences of things, the confirmation of their essences and accidents, and even the temporality of created things and the eternity

of the permanent things are arguments on the fundamentality of existence.<sup>20</sup>

In fact, from the point of view of Āqā ‘Alī the accidental predication of the affirmative concepts in being affirmative on whatness in both of the following cases is an argument on the fundamentality of existence:

First, the concepts beyond the essence of whatness whose truth and applicability to whatness need an intermediary in occurrence, such as the concepts of existence, maker, and the made, the attributes of existential truths which run through all creatures and are not incompatible with the necessity of existence, and also the concepts like blackness and particularity.

Second, the concepts whose truth and applicability need an intermediary in reality, such as the concomitants and essentials of whatness, the concise form of the defined in the compound whatnesses, the unified form of the parts of compound whatnesses in the external, the origination of the created things and the eternity of the permanent things.

This argument is one of the innovations of the founder philosopher and has no precedence in the philosophical works hitherto written. ‘Allāme Seyyed Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabā’ī, who was indirectly a student of Āqā ‘Alī Modarres, for the first time emphasized the view of Āqā ‘Alī in the form of the first ramification of the fundamentality of existence and the respectivalness of whatness, in *Nahāyatu’l-ḥikma (The End of Theosophy)*, though he does not refer to the source of this view in his book. From the point of view of ‘Allāme Ṭabāṭabā’ī, predication of a thing on whatness is only possible through existence. Existence in all whatish predications is a conditioned aspect, for whatness in itself is perishing and void, and the perishing is non-existent. Therefore, the subsistence of essence and the essentials of whatness are possible for whatness only by means of existence, though when whatness such as becomes the subject of the consideration by the intellect, it is nothing other than itself, neither existent nor non-existent. However, separating existence from whatness in this level (meaning existence is not taken from the definition of whatness) is not incompatible with the predica-

tion of existence on whatness, while it is out of the definition of whatness and is incidental to it. Therefore, in whatever form whatness is imagined, it would not be free from a kind of subsistence.

Likewise the concomitants of the essence of whatness which are the concomitants of whatness, such as the concept of *whatness* which is incidental to whatness and the concept of evenness incidental to whatness of four, are confirmed for whatness through the intermediary of existence and not for themselves. Therefore, as Moḥaqqueq Davānī assumes, a concomitant of whatness is truly a concomitant of external and intellectual existence. In the same way, the concomitants of intellectual existence, such as typicality for man, the concomitants for external existence, such as coldness for snow, unnecessary and accidental predicates such as writing for man, all are predicated on whatness through the intermediary of existence. Considering the above points, we understand that existence is one of the concomitants of whatness and is outside and beyond its essence.<sup>21</sup>

From the point of view of 'Allāme, predicating six predicates of essence, essentials, the concomitants of essence, the concomitants of intellectual existence, the concomitants of external existence, and the unnecessary predicates on whatness is possible only through the intermediary of existence. Āqā 'Alī has referred to all of these six items in his detailed and documented remarks.

One of the contemporary masters of philosophy has not accepted the above view in its totality, and in his commentary on this stand of *The End of Theosophy* he wrote:

The conclusion of the speech of the author is that on the basis of its respectivalness, whatness, cannot essentially be realized in any of the vessels of reality, either in the mind or in the external, and when it has no reality in its essence unless through the intermediary of existence, then nothing will be confirmed for whatness except through the intermediary of existence. This view is justified in all that commonly predicated on whatness, for the criterion of this predication is unity in existence. But in what is predicated on essence in primary predication, such as com-

plete definition, the predication of species and differentia on whatness – when supposedly it is of primary predication – the existence of the subject in such cases would not be necessary. Although whatness is never devoid of existence, either in the mind or in the external, this is not incompatible with disregarding existence and restricting our views to the concept itself. Therefore, the essentials of whatness are predicated on it in primary predication. Saying that whatness in its essence is nothing other than itself, “necessitates the realization of essence and the essential in that which is excepted. Therefore, predicating them on essence, without regarding existence of whatness, is correct.”<sup>22</sup>

The detailed and elaborate and at the same time deep and substantial remarks of the original philosopher shows clearly the defectiveness of the above view. For, as is shown already, the realization of whatness in an essential way is also possible through the realization of existence. Although in the vessel of its deliberation and analysis, the intellect separates whatness from existence and looks at it stripped of existence, this separation of existence in the vessel of deliberation is the very mixing with existence, for intellectual deliberation is a kind of perception; and perception is one of the accidents of existence; and the accidents of existence are indeed the very existence.<sup>23</sup>

### C) The Third Argument

Discussing preliminaries of the resurrection of the body, in his *Marginal Notes on Asfār* Āqā ‘Alī wrote:

“In the past, the Creator, the All-Wise and the Benefactor, gifted me an argument which, if it was not inclusive of all, but was inclusive of many arguments on the fundamentality of existence established by Mollā Ṣadrā in his works. I expressed this argument with clear premises in another work; however, I explain it here for the sharp-sighted people in brief.”<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately, Āqā ‘Alī did not specify the exact work in which he expressed the argument in detail. Though it has some common points with the first argument of *Badāyī‘u’l-ḥikam*, this argument should not be

counted as its summary. Of course, philosophers often used to add new points in every new authorship even though their intention had been writing an epitome down, as this could be confirmed and concluded by comparison of Mollā Ṣadrā's *Ash-shawāhidu 'r-rubūbiyya* with *Asfār*, or with *Muntaḥabu 'l-Ḥāqānī* with *Luma'āt-i ilāhiyya* by Āqā 'Alī's father, Mollā 'Abdollāh Zonūzī.

The second probability is that by his "other work" Āqā 'Alī meant his book named *Uṣūlu 'l-ḥikam*. He presented a new argument for the fundamentality of existence in *Uṣūlu 'l-ḥikam*, as this could be concluded from his *Treatise on the Issues of Predication*.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately, the book *Uṣūlu 'l-ḥikam* has been lost; so a certain judgement regarding it is not possible. Anyway, this very concise argument can be distinctively expressed in the following order:

[First Premise:] Whatever is beyond the considered level as such and indeed is true about it, its truth concerning such a whatness and its realization is possible only in a level beyond the essence of whatness. Thus, its truth on whatness is, in virtue of an aspect additional to the essence of whatness, whether it is causal or conditioned. This aspect is restricted to four states: either it is non-existence, or whatness, or the concept of existence, or the reality of existence.

[Second premise:] This aspect cannot be non-existence, for non-existence as such has no causation, requirement, and subordination.

[Third Premise:] This aspect cannot be one of the whatnesses, for it is proved in its proper place that "whatness in its essence is nothing other than itself". If it essentially requires the truth of a predicate beyond its essence on itself, then it is restricted to two states: either it is a requirement in itself, or the requirement is beyond its essence. If it is essentially as such, the direction of the essence of whatness required by itself is exactly identical with the direction of the requirement, otherwise it is not essentially required, for there is no reality other than concepts. Secondly it requires that the concept of requirement be exactly the same as that of the required, and consequently the concept of origin is the same as that of the derivative, without any kind of difference which is men-

tally-posed and which is evidently false. But if we assume that requirement is beyond whatness and based on it, our words will turn to the requiring and what whatness depends on; that is once again, it will end up to the requirement in the level of whatness, and thus, the two previously mentioned problems will arise (that is, the overthrown of the concept of whatness to the concept of requirement, and the uniting of the concepts of origin and derivative), but if the requirement is a thing beyond whatness, while not being based on it, only the latter problem will arise (that is, the concept of requirement is the same as the concept of the required and consequently the concept of origin will be the same as that of the derivative, without any expression, though mentally-posed.)

[Fourth premise:] Whether it is causal or conditioned, this aspect is something different from non-existence and whatness. Nor can it be the concept of existence. For what is said in the third premise is also true about concepts. Thus, this aspect is of a kind completely different from that of concepts.

[Conclusion:] The aforementioned aspect is only the reality of existence, that is, it exists by itself and essentially is an instance of the predication of existent on it.<sup>26</sup>

Regarding this argument the following comments may be found useful:

1. The argument is started with the assumption of whatness as such; if a thing is beyond this status of whatness, it may be true to whatness. These truth and realization are outside the essence of whatness, and they are with an aspect additional to its essence. Non-existence, whatness, and the concept of existence are not able to play the role of this aspect, and inevitably the reality of existence is only the cause of the truth and realization in question. This is a simple form of the argument. Its support is whatness as such; that is, acceptance of whatish establishment, and then acceptance of that outside this whatish aspect there is a vessel in which entities exist; and these are

true to whatness. What was mentioned is counted as the presumption of the argument. Of course, the multiplicity of presumptions decreases the value of an argument or an essentially philosophical problem; especially if the axis of the argument for the fundamentality of existence is the concept of whatness.

2. The circuit of this argument is based on the predication and truth. The external things are not predicated on whatness without reality of existence. Non-existence, whatness and the concept of existence in the truth of external things outside whatness are not effective on whatness. However, this argument is different from the third argument expressed in *Al-mashā'ir*<sup>27</sup> which is also based upon predication. They may not be assumed as the versions of the same argument; for the argument mentioned in *Al-mashā'ir* is founded on that without existence the unity which is necessary for the predication is not realized, while principally this argument is not established through unity and difference.
3. Like most of the arguments for the fundamentality of existence, this argument is based on the concept of whatness as such. The proponents of the fundamentality of whatness have concord with the proponents of the fundamentality of existence that the status of whatness as such is not original and fundamental in the external reality. The proponents of the fundamentality of whatness speak of something called the realized whatness which is regarded as original and fundamental. If it is proved that whatness as such is respectival, it does not follow that the realized whatness is not original and fundamental. It is true that by analysing the realized whatness into the two concepts of whatness and existence it can be concluded that the realization of the very realized whatness is from existence; nonetheless, without this simple suggestion the argument will be incomplete.

4. Although the conditioned aspect is stated in this argument, its framework is founded on causal aspect. The negligence from explaining the conditioned aspect in the argument can be justified that Āqā 'Alī repeatedly in his works emphasized on the reduction of the conditioned aspect to the causal aspect in some way.<sup>28</sup> So, according to the causal aspect the argument is somehow complete.
5. This argument is different from all arguments established by Mollā Ṣadrā and the explanations of Sabzevārī. Therefore, it can be considered as a new argument for the fundamentality of existence. However, two points should be regarded: First, Āqā 'Alī's believing that this argument is inclusive of, if not all but most arguments of Mollā Ṣadrā for the fundamentality of existence is not acceptable. It is unlikely that Āqā 'Alī neglected the inclusiveness of the argument in summarizing the detailed argument into a brief one. Second, in the view of the comment mentioned in the first item, this argument is preferred in comparison to some arguments previously established, especially in comparison to an argument summarized as follows:
  - a. How is not existence fundamental while every thing leaves the state of indifference towards existence or non-existence through it and comes into reality<sup>29</sup>
  - b. which in my opinion is the most effective argument of Mollā Ṣadrā regarding
  - c. the fundamentality of existence, previous to Āqā 'Alī's?

#### *D) The Fourth Argument*

In his *Treatise on the Relational Existence* and *Treatise on the Issues of Predication*, Āqā 'Alī established a detailed argument for the fundamentality of existence which, firstly, is different from his own previous arguments, and secondly, has novelty in comparison with the other arguments established by Mollā Ṣadrā and Sabzevārī. The summary of this argument follows:

Existence essentially has reality; while whatness does accidentally have reality. Considering the meaning of whatness and existence, this judgement is one of the clearest primary principles. But for its completeness we say: Existence which has external reality excludes non-existence; and it is united with whatness in identity or externality. By "externality" it is meant outside the vessel of the mind and the realm of conception. How is it possible for existence to be separate from being existent? If the separation between existence and whatness is assumed, the state of existence may be imagined to take the following forms:

1. Existence is a part of whatness.
2. Whatness is a part of existence.
3. Existence is an accident of whatness and dependent on it, like additional attributes to their subjects.
4. Similarly, whatness is an accident of existence.
5. Existence and whatness are the two attributes of the same subject.
6. Existence and whatness are the subject of the same attribute.
7. Existence is an accident of whatness and united with it and dependent on it in reality.
8. Whatness is an accident of existence and united with it and dependent on it in reality.

However, seven forms are false; only the last one is favoured and correct.<sup>30</sup>

Many times Āqā 'Alī used the argument of predication from among Mollā Ṣadrā's arguments, to prove the fundamentality of existence.<sup>31</sup> However, among the four innovative arguments of Āqā 'Alī the first one is the most valuable, then the second one has some remarkable points.

### Conclusion

1. Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī offered a new version from the point of contention regarding the fundamentality of existence; but his explanation is not acceptable.
2. The contention between the proponents of the fundamentality of existence and the proponents of the fundamentality of whatness cannot be counted as a verbal one.
3. In the opinion of Āqā 'Alī, if the point of contention regarding the fundamentality of existence is explained correctly, then the issue will be evident or almost evident; but the claim of being evident in the fundamental and differential problems is not a suitable solution.
4. Āqā 'Alī established four new arguments for the fundamentality of existence. Two arguments of *Badāyi'u'l-hikam* have more validity and strength than the others. His first argument is counted as one of the most valuable arguments for the fundamentality of existence.
5. Although among the transcendent philosophers – after Mollā Ṣadrā – in the issue regarding the fundamentality of existence, Āqā 'Alī offered more new remarks than the others, he remained in the framework of Ṣadrian philosophy and did not add anything to its foundations. His philosophical meditations led to the innovation of new arguments on the fundamentality of existence and new outcomes on the issue of whatness.

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<sup>1</sup> Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm Ṣadro'l-Mote'allehīn, *Al-mashā'ir*, ed. Henry Corbin, Tehran: Ṭahūrī, 1982, pp. 9-27, 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm Ṣadro'l-Mote'allehīn, *al-Asfār al-arba'a* (Four Journeys), vol. 1, Beirut: Dāru'l-Ahyā'i't-Turaṭi'l-'Arabī, pp. 38-39, 54-63.

<sup>3</sup> Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm Ṣadro'l-Mote'allehīn, *al-Masā'ilu 'l-qudsiyya*, included in *Rasā'el-e falsafī*, ed. S. J. Āshtiyāni, Qom: Islamic Propagation Office, 1983, pp. 10-17.

<sup>4</sup> Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm Ṣadro'l-Mote'allehīn, *Ta'liqāt-e sharḥ-e hikmatu 'l-ishrāq* (Glosses on the Commentary upon *Hikmatu 'l-ishrāq*), Tehran: Lithography.

<sup>5</sup> Seyyed Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *Oṣūl-e falsafa va raveshe re'ālism* (Principles of Philosophy and Methodology of Realism), Footnotes by Morteżā Moṭahhari, Tehran: Ṣadrā, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup> Moḥammad Taqī Mesbāḥ Yazdī, *Ta'liqa 'alā nahāyati 'l-ḥikma*, Qom: Dar Rāh-e Ḥaqq Institute, pp. 20, 30.

<sup>7</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Zonūzī, *Badāyī'u 'l-ḥikam*, arranged by Ahmad Vā'ezi, Tehran: Az-Zahra, 1997, pp. 210-220.

<sup>8</sup> Mollā Hādī Sabzevārī, *Ḥawāshī-ye al-asfār* (Marginal Glosses on al-Asfār), Beirut, vol. 1, Dāru'l-Ahyā'i't-Turaṭi'l-'Arabī, 1981, pp. 38-39, 54-63; *Ibid*, *Sharḥu 'l-manzūma*, ed. Mas'ūd Ṭālebī, Tehran: Nāb, 1413 A.H., pp. 12, 66.

<sup>9</sup> Shahābeddīn Sohravardī, *Hikmatu 'l-ishrāq, mağmū'e-ye moşannafāt-e Shayḥu 'l-Ishrāq*, ed. H. Corbin, vol. 2, Tehran: Anğoman-e ḥekmat va falsafe, 1976, pp. 65-73.

<sup>10</sup> Morteżā Moṭahhari, *Maqālāt-e falsafī* (Philosophical Articles), vol. 3, Tehran: Ṣadrā, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Risāla fī mabāḥiṭu 'l-ḥaml, mağmū'e-ye moşannafāt-e Ḥakīm Mo'asses*, vol. 2, pp. 221-224, 231-232, 239.

- <sup>12</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Risāla fī wuḡūdi 'r-rābiʿ, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e Ḥakīm Mo'asses*, vol. 2, pp. 181-184.
- <sup>13</sup> Seyyed Ḡalāl Āshtiyānī, *Hastī az naẓar-e falsafe va 'erfān* (Being as Viewed in Philosophy and Gnosis), Tehran: Nehzat-e zanān-e mosalmān, 1981, pp. 56-57, 108-129.
- <sup>14</sup> Mollā Aḥmad Ardakānī Shīrāzī, *Hāshiyatu 'l-mashā'ir* (Marginal Glosses on Al-mashā'ir), Tehran: Lithography.
- <sup>15</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Ta'liqātu 'sh-shawāhidi 'r-rubūbiyya, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e ḥakīm*, pp. 278, 285.
- <sup>16</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Zonūzī, *Badāyī'u 'l-ḥikam*, arranged by Aḥmad Vā'ezī, Tehran: Az-Zahrā, 1997, pp. 210-220.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid, pp. 210-220.
- <sup>18</sup> Ḥā'erī Māzandarānī Semnānī, *Wadāyī'u 'l-ḥikam fī kashfi ḥadāyī'u badāyī'i 'l-ḥikam*, Ḥekmat-e Bū 'Alī Sinā, vol. 3.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Zonūzī, *Badāyī'u 'l-ḥikam*, arranged by Aḥmad Vā'ezī, Tehran: Az-Zahrā, 1997, pp. 210-220.
- <sup>21</sup> Seyyed Moḥammad Ḥoseyn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *Nahāyatu 'l-ḥikma*, Ghom: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Eslāmī, 1406 A.H., p. 12.
- <sup>22</sup> Moḥammad Taqī Mešbāḥ Yazdī, *Ta'liqa 'alā nahāyati 'l-ḥikma*, Ghom: Dar Rāh-e Ḥaqq Institute, pp. 20, 30.
- <sup>23</sup> 'Abdollāh Ḡavadi 'Āmelī, *Rahīq-e mahtūm*, vol. 1, part 1, Ghom: Nashr-e Asrā, 1997, p. 332.
- <sup>24</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Ta'liqātu 'l-asfār, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e Ḥakīm Mo'asses*, vol. 2, p. 673 (Ta'liqe-ye 1634), pp. 673-674.
- <sup>25</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Risāla fī mabāḥiṭi 'l-ḥaml, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e ḥakīm*, vol. 2, pp. 221-224, 231-232, 239.
- <sup>26</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Ta'liqātu 'l-asfār, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e Ḥakīm Mo'asses*, vol. 2, p. 673 (Ta'liqe-ye 1634), pp. 673-674.
- <sup>27</sup> Moḥammad b. Ebrāhīm Ṣadro 'l-Mota'allehīn, *Al-masā'ilu 'l-quḍsiyya*, included in *Rasā'el-e falsafī*, ed. Seyyed Djalāleddīn Āshtiyānī, Ghom: Daftar-e Tabliqāt-e Eslāmī, 1983, pp. 10-17.
- <sup>28</sup> Āqā 'Alī Modarres Zonūzī, *Badāyī'u 'l-ḥikam*, arranged by Aḥmad Vā'ezī, Tehran: Az-Zahrā, 1997, pp. 210-220;
- Āqā 'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Ta'liqātu 'l-asfār, maḡmū'e-ye moʿannafāt-e Ḥakīm Mo'asses*, vol. 2, p. 673 (Ta'liqe-ye 1634), pp. 673-674.

<sup>29</sup> Mollā Hādī Sabzevārī, *Sharḥu 'l-manẓūma*, ed. Mas'ūd Ṭālebī, Tehran: Nashr-e Nāb, 1413 A.H., pp. 12, 66.

<sup>30</sup> Āqā'Alī Modarres Tehrānī, *Risāla fī mabāḥiṭi 'l-'amal*, pp. 221-224, 231-232, 239.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, *Risāla fī 'l-wuḡūdi 'r-rābiṭ*, pp. 181-184.