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Al-Allāma al-Ḥilli and Shiʿite Muʿtazilite Theology

1.

Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥilli, who is usually known as al-Allāma al-Ḥilli (648/1250-726/1325), is certainly not an unknown figure among western scholars on Islam. His major contribution to the development of Shiʿite law has long been acknowledged and his legal works are considered nowadays among the Shiʿite community as belonging to the most authoritative writings in this field. Moreover, he contributed important writings in the field of methodology of law (uṣūl al-fiqh) where especially his Kitāb Ḥabīb al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl and his more extensive Kitāb Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-uṣūl should be mentioned.

Especially because of the translation of his creed Bāb al-ḥadīt Qashar together with al-Fāḍil al-Miqdīd al-Suyūṭī's (d. 821/1418) commentary on it by W. M. Miller into English which was published in 1928, al-Ḥilli became further known as an authority in Shiʿite theology. Among Shiʿites, especially his more concise treatises on theology are studied until today as basic texts on theology.

Al-Ḥilli's views on the Imamate as they appear from his Kitāb Minhaj al-karama fi l-imamah which was refuted by Ibn Taymiyya in his K. Minhaj al-sunnah have been investigated by Henri Laoust in a number of articles.

The present article will attempt to outline the principal characteristics of the theological views of the Allāma al-Ḥilli in comparison with other relevant developments in Islamic thought.

Taking into consideration that al-Allāma al-Ḥilli belonged to the last innovative Muʿtazilite school in Shiʿism, this article will be subdivided into two parts.

The first part will provide a short outline of the development of Shiʿite theology up to the time of al-Ḥilli. The second part will mainly be concerned with al-Ḥilli's theological views and will provide an attempt to show al-Ḥilli's place in the development of Shiʿite kalām in relation to other theological schools in Islam.
2.1

The earliest Imami theologians engaged in theological discussions already in the second century A.H., i.e. in the time of the sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sādiq (d.148/765). Their chief representatives were Muḥammad b. al-Nuṣayr, usually called Shayṭān al-Ṭaq among his opponents, Zurara b. Aḥyān (d.150/767), Hishām b. ʿAlī al-Jawāfī and Hisām b. al-Ḥakam (d.179/795–6). None of their writings are extant and our knowledge about their theological views is restricted to the titles of their works as they are reported by Ibn al-Nadim and Shaykh al-Tūsī and to the reports of the different heresiographers, especially al-Ashʿarī.

Their theological doctrines are characterised by their direct disagreement with the commonly accepted views of the Muʿtaṣilītes and as such also with the views of the later Shiʿites.

With respect to some of their positions, parallels can be found between these earlier Imami theologians and the Sunnite traditionalists, for example when they maintained that God is, after having created space, immanent in space, namely His throne, or when they ascribe motion to God. In their teaching about God's attributes, however, the early Imami thinkers disagreed with all parties. They rejected the concept of essential divine attributes which are not subject to change and maintained rather that all divine attributes are subject to constant change. God does not know for instance all things from eternity because this would necessitate the eternity of things. Rather, He knows only existent things.

In regard to the question of man's acts they supported the concept of freedom of choice. On the other hand, however, they did not agree with the Muʿtaṣilītes that man is the only author of his acts but held rather an intermediate position between the adherents of constraint (jabr) and the Muʿtaṣilīte position of empowerment (taḥwīd). Hisām b. al-Ḥakam for instance maintained that although man's act is to be defined as his choice since it results from his will, he is nonetheless constrained in his act because he requires an occasion produced by God for his act.

However, the theory of the imamate as it was developed by Hisām b. al-Ḥakam remained the basis for the later fully developed Imami doctrine. Mankind is in permanent need for a divinely guided Imam as authority in religious matters. He is impeccable (maʿṣūm) but does not receive divine messages (waḥy). Each Imam was installed by his predecessor by an explicit appointment (nass) and whoever rejects the Imam of his age is an infidel (kāfir).

After the death of Hisām b. al-Ḥakam who differed at times from the positions of the other representatives of the school because he was influenced by the dualists, the doctrines of the school were carried on for some time. Because of opposition both from rival Shiʿite theological
schools and the Shi'ite traditionalists who opposed the engagement in *kalām* in general, the school became soon extinct.

The first Imami theological school which, though being independent, maintained positions very similar to the chief Mu'tazilite views was founded by the Banū Nawbakht. Their chief representatives were Abu Ismā'īl b. Ali b. Abi Sahl b. Nawbakht (d.311/923-4) and his nephew Abu Muhammad al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Nawbakhti (d. between 300/912 and 316/923).

Since none of their works are extant, their positions can only be deduced from the titles of their works. The main secondary source for the reconstruction of their views is the *Awā'il al-maqrīzī* by Shaykh al-Mufid (d.413/1022) where their views are regularly mentioned.

It should be noted here that the *Kitāb al-Yaqūt* which was written by a certain Abu Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Nawbakht and upon which al-Ḥilli wrote a commentary entitled *Anwar al-malakūt fi sharh al-Yaqūt* does evidently not reflect the views of the Banū Nawbakht. It has been suggested that this work was written at least one or to centuries later than the year 340/941 which has been suggested by ʿAbbās Iqbal in his study on the Banū Nawbakht. This view can be supported by the fact that Abu Ishāq holds positions which are usually identical with the views of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d.436/1044). Since it is highly unlikely that Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī would follow such an obscure writer, as al-Ḥilli suggested concerning one question, one may rather assume that Abu Ishāq belonged to those Shi'ite Mu'tazilites whose theological views were influenced by the views of the school of Abu l-Husayn al-Baṣrī.

The Banū Nawbakht agreed with the Mu'tazilites in their principal theses of God's unity (*tawḥīd*) as they opposed any anthropomorphic conception of God and of His justice as they affirmed human free will and opposed the view that God creates man's acts. Although they held firm to the Imamite doctrine of the Imamate with the result that they disagreed with the Mu'ṭazilites on some related matters, they were nearer to the Mu'ṭazilites in regard to some points than later Shi'ite theologians. They denied for instance that the Imams may work miracles, they agreed with the Mu'ṭazilites that there is an absolute difference between major and minor sins and affirmed likewise mutual cancellation between good and evil deeds. Against the Mu'ṭazilites, however, they denied the intermediary position of the grave sinner between the believer and the unbeliever, they affirmed the principle of intercession of the prophet and the Imams on the Day of Judgement for the grave sinners of their community and maintained that the Qur'ān had undergone deletions and additions.
The strongest opposition to the kalām practice of the Banū Nawbakht which presumably led also to the extinction of this school came from the Shi'ite traditionalists whose most important representative was Abū Ja'far Muḥ. b. Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ḥusayn b. Mūsā b. Babūya al-Qummī, who is known as Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381/991).

Similar to their Sunnite counterparts, the Imami traditionalists categorically rejected the use of reason in religious discussions. However, in contrast to the Sunnites, Shi'ite traditionalism shared a number of decisive notions with the Mu'tazilites. This circumstance was apparently the reason that Mu'tazilism turned eventually out to be the prevalent religious current in Shi'ism while traditionalism did never achieve such a strong position as it did in Sunnism. This general tendency of Shi'ite traditionalism goes back to as far as the Imam Ja'far al-Ṣadīq some of whose statements supported an intermediate position between Sunnite traditionalism and Mu'tazilite doctrine, e.g. on the question of free will versus predestination. Other traditions most of which are ascribed to the eighth Imam ʿAlī Riḍā (d. 203/818) support a concept of God which is in its abstraction and rationality closer to the Mu'tazilite than to the Sunnite traditionalist view. Ibn Babūya relied in his views usually on those traditions which are closer to the Mu'tazilite position.

A major step towards the adoption of Mu'tazilite theology among Shi'ites was taken by Shaykh Abu ʿAbd Allāh Muḥ. b. Muḥ. b. Nu'mān al-Mufid (d. 413/1022) who was a student of Ibn Babūya. He is also the first Shi'ite theologian whose works on kalām are extant. The most important of his works are his Sharḥ ʿAqā'id al-Ṣadūq, or Taṣḥīḥ al-ʿIqād, in which he criticizes especially Ibn Babūya's traditionalist attitudes, and his Kitāb awā'il al-maqālāt.

In contrast to Ibn Babūya, al-Mufid affirms the use of reason in religious matters. However, he does not go as far as the Mu'tazilites who employed reason to the degree of the exclusion of traditions in order to support their positions. He rejects for instance the possibility to assign names to God which do not have any basis in the Qurʾān and the traditions even if reason points to them.

In his theological views, al-Mufid usually takes the position of the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdad which he considers as less rationalist than the school of Basra which denied that revelation leads to knowledge about fundamental theological questions.

Al-Sharīf al-Murtada, also called ʿAlam al-Hudā (d. 436/1044) who was a student of al-Mufid disagreed with his teacher in two respects. Reason is in his view the only authority which leads to the truth in religious matters while knowledge derived from revelation and especially from
traditions which is in conflict with reason must be rejected. This principle also influenced his views in the sphere of legal methodology (usul al-fiqh) where he outrightly rejected any authority of single traditions (akhbār al-aḥād). In his theological views, al-Murtaḍā followed in contrast to al-Mufid usually the position of the school of Basra as it was fully developed by Abū Hashim al-Jubbārī (d. 321/933) whose followers are known as the Bahshamīyya. Al-Murtaḍā became acquainted with the doctrines of this school when he studied in Baghdad with the famous Qādi Abī al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the author of the extensive Kitāb al-Muğni fi abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadd, and the less known Abū Ishāq al-Nasībīnī (d. 408/1017). His theological views can be studied in his numerous less extensive kālim works and treatises which are edited. His two major kālim works, the Kitāb al-Muṭakākhkhas fi usul al-dīn and the Kitāb al-Dhakhira fi ʿilm al-kālim are partly extant in manuscript. A commentary on his more concise kālim work Kitāb Jumāl al-ʿilm wa-l-ʿamal or Kitāb Jumāl al-ʿaqāʾid was written by his student Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 459/1067) in his work Kitāb Tamhīd al-usul fi ʿilm al-kālim. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī followed in his theological views usually the position of al-Murtaḍā as it can be seen in his Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād al-hādi ʿilā ʿarīq al-rashād.

2.2

With al-Murtaḍā, the fusion of Muṭazzilism and Shiʿism was completed. However, Imamism did not compromise with Muṭazzilism concerning those principles of belief which derived from their specific doctrine of the Imamate. Since, according to Imami doctrine, the world cannot exist any moment without an Imam who is the guide of mankind, the Imamate is the very foundation of belief. This belief led them to reject the Muṭazzilite principle about the intermediary position of a grave sinner between a believer and an unbeliever. Consequently, they also denied the Muṭazzilite absolute differentiation between major and minor sins and the principle of mutual cancellation (taʿābūr). The Muṭazzilites held that if a person does a good act after having committed a minor sin, the reward he deserves for the good act cancels out the punishment he deserved because of the previous sin. The same mechanism applies vice versa. However, if he committed a major sin, the punishment he deserves for it can impossibly be cancelled out by any good act. Moreover, because of the major sin, all the reward this person deserved previously because of his good acts is likewise automatically cancelled out. The Imamis, in contrast, held that not even a major sin may cancel out any of the eternal reward man deserves for his belief. A true believer can rather be certain of eternal reward in the Hereafter for his belief even if he may be punished
temporarily for his sins. Thus, because of this view and since the Imamis believed that the prophet and the Imams will intercede for the believers among their community on the Day of Judgement, they rejected further the Mu'tazilite principle of the unconditional and eternal punishment of the grave sinner.

3.1

The last innovative Mu'tazilite school in Shi‘ism was introduced by the philosopher and astronomer Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). His positions as they appear from his kalam works, notably his Taḥrīd al-ʿAqāʾīd, were shared by his contemporary Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bājrānī (d. 699/1300) and fully developed by his student al-ʿAlī al-Ḥilli in his numerous theological works.

A number of important developments had occurred in Islamic thought during the centuries immediately preceding this last Imamite Mu'tazilite school which had a major impact upon their theology. In the realm of Mu'tazilism, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī (d. 436/1044) who was a student of the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbar had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Ḥāshim. Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of kalam, Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī's views were very successful to such an extent that his school could establish itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya. Eventually, his views survived longer than the teachings of the Bahshamiyya since they were adopted by some of the Zaydī Mu'tazilites and, as will be seen later, to a much larger extent by the Imamite Mu'tazilites.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī, whose entire kalam works are lost, are the writings of the later follower of his school Rūkh al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Malāḥīmī (d. 536/1141), the shorter Kitāb al-falāq fī usūl al-dīn and the more extensive Kitāb al-muṣāsamād fī usūl al-dīn which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the Kitāb al-kāmil fī-l-istiqaṣā' fīnāh balaghānā min kalām al-qudamā by Taqī al-Dīn al-Najdī (or: al-Bājrānī) al-ʿAjālī about whom no further biographical data are known. This work which highlights the differences between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarī was written between 535/1141 and 675/1276-7.

Another development was the growing fascination among the different theologians with the philosophical thought of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended
nevertheless to adopt more and more the philosophical terminology and even elements of the philosophical teachings as long as they could possibly be brought into agreement with their theological principles. Abu l-Hasayn al-Baṣrī who seems to have studied with the Christian Abu ʿAli b. al-Samḥ philosophy and sciences was considered by later writers like al-Shahrastānī and Ibn al-Qūṭī to have been deeply influenced by the concept of the philosophers although this view is disputed among modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.

The influence of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) who is famous for having fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns" (ṭariq al-mutawakkilīn) in Ashʿarīte kalām through freely mixing philosophical and theological concepts and terminology. However, despite this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually displays a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines holding on to the traditional Ashʿarīte views. An exception is his Kitāb al-maḥāṣṣah al-mashriqiyya which he wrote in his youth and in which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abu ʿBarākāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1152).

A further peculiarity of the theology of al-Rāzī is that he often adopts the theological concepts of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī whereby he modifies and interprets them in such a way that they support the Ashʿarīte rather than the Muʿtazilite point of view.

The reason for this was that al-Rāzī at a relatively early stage of his life had spent some time in Khuwarizm which was the last remaining center of Muʿtazilism at his time where he engaged in theological discussions with Muʿtazilites, apparently with the explicit purpose of "converting" the Muʿtazilites to Ashʿarism. Since it is known that the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī together with the Bahshamiyya was well-represented at al-Raʾī's time in Khuwarizm, al-Raʾī became on this occasion thoroughly acquainted with the doctrines of the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

These developments had a major impact upon the theology of the Shiʿite theologians in the time of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. They almost completely adopted the views of the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in theological questions. On the other hand, however, they often substituted philosophical terminology as used by al-Rāzī for the traditional Muʿtazilite terminology in their theological writings. To a varying extent, they deviated also from the positions of the earlier Muʿtazilites when they adopted philosophical positions. The peak of this development was Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who appeared in his various philosophical works as a consistent defender of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and who substituted in his
theological work Tajrid al-Aqā'id philosophy for the theological views where this did not interfere with theology, i.e. in the realm of physics and what is usually called the "subtleties of kalām" (laţāf al-kalām).

Al-Iḥlī's writings are well suited for studying the theological views of the Shi'ite Mu'tazilites in this period since he wrote a large number of theological works the majority of which is extant. This does not apply to Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī whose main importance as a writer lies in his philosophical and Isma'īlī works rather than in his theological works and equally not to al-Bahrānī whose only extant theological work is the concise Kitāb al-Qawā'id fi 'ilm al-kalām.

Among al-Iḥlī's works on theology the most extensive one is the Kitāb Nihayat al-Marām fi 'īlm al-kalām of which only very few manuscripts exist and which was apparently not often available to later scholars. Even the famous commentator of al-Iḥlī, al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūtī (d. 826/1423), apparently had no copy. Other important works of al-Iḥlī which he wrote at a very early stage of his scholarly career are especially his Kitāb Manāhij al-Yaqīn fi usūl al-dīn which was completed in 680/1281-2 and his Maqārīj al-faḥm fi sharḥ nuẓūm al-barāhīn which was compiled apparently even before the Manāhij. At a later stage of his life, he wrote the shorter works Kitāb Nahj al-Mustashridin fi usūl al-dīn which was completed in 699/1299-1300 and the Kitāb Tasālik al-Nafs ila 'aqrāb al-quds which was completed in 704/1304-5. While al-Iḥlī often refrains in the Kitāb Tasālik al-Nafs from indicating his own position restricting himself to the presentation of the views of the different parties, he usually expresses his own view explicitly in his Kitāb Nahj al-Mustashridin. During his stay at the court of the Ilkhan Uljaytu, which lasted roughly from 709/1309-10 until 714/1314-5 or even 716/1316-7, al-Iḥlī wrote upon the request of Uljaytu a number of polemical works especially against the Ash'ārites. The most famous among these are the Kitāb Nahj al-Ikāq wa-Kashf al-Šīdq and the Kitāb Minhaj al-Karama fi l-Imāma. These later works are in general not very helpful for the reconstruction of al-Iḥlī's theological views since his main concern in these works is with polemics rather than with the elaboration of his own position.

Al-Iḥlī was fully acquainted with the above mentioned developments in Islamic thought which influenced his theology to a large extent. During his youth which he spent in al-Ḥilla he was introduced to the earlier Shi'ite kalām literature by his father Sadīd al-Dīn and the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ṭawūs (d. 73/1274) and Rādī al-Dīn b. al-Ṭawūs (d. 664/1266). At the latest during his stay at the Maragha observatory which was founded by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the
Ilkhan Hulaku, al-\-\-lili became acquainted with the positions of the school of Abu l-Husayn al-Basri. Al-\-\-lili wrote a commentary after Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's death on the latter's *Tajrid al-Qas\-\-\-d* which is influenced to a large extent by the doctrine of the school of Abu l-Husayn al-Basri. Presumably, he met also Mitham b. Mitham al-Bahrani at the Maragha observatory who also usually preferred the positions of the school of Abu l-Husayn al-Basri in his theological work *Kitab al-Qaw\-\-\-d fi 'Ilm al-kalim*.

Especially from his *kalim* work *Manahij al-Yaqin fi was\-\-\-l al-din* it is evident that al-\-\-lili must have had copies of Ibn al-Mala\-\-\-im's *Kitab al-Faq\-\-\-* and Taqi al-Din's *Kitab al-Kamil* since it is almost certain that he quotes from both works.

Al-\-\-lili was furthermore acquainted with the theological and philosophical works of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi which he studied with his teacher al-Katibi al-Qazwini (d. 675/1276) whom he likewise met at Maragha.

During his stay at Maragha al-\-\-lili received moreover his philosophical education under the supervision of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi with whom he studied mainly the *Ilahiyyat* of the *Kitab al-Shifa* of Ibn Sina and al-Katibi al-Qazwini who introduced him to the works of Athir al-Din Mufaddal b. Umar al-Abhari (d.663/1264) and Mu\-\-\-h. b. Namawar b. Abd al-Malik al-Khu\-\-\-ji (d.646/1247). On two of al-Katibi's works, the *Risala al-shamsiyya* and the *Ij\-\-\-mat al-Qayn*, al-\-\-lili wrote commentaries.

He was probably at least to some extent acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al\-\-\-Arabi (d. 638/1240) through his teacher Shams al-Din Mu\-\-\-h. b. Mu\-\-h. b. Ahmad al-Kishi (d. 695/1295-6) who was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al\-\-\-Arabi and who was a Sufi himself and with the doctrine of illumination of al-Suhrawardi (d. 587/1191). Later authors attributed to al-\-\-lili a work entitled *Sharh Ij\-\-\-mat al-Ishra\-\-g* by which the *Ij\-\-\-mat al-Ishra\-\-g* by al-Suhrawardi presumably is meant. However, al-\-\-lili does not mention such a work in his own two lists of his works, one in his *rijal* work *Kitab Khulasat al-Aqw\-\-\-l*, written in 693/1293-4, and the second in an *Ij\-\-\-za* which he issued to his student Mu\-\-\-h. b. Sin\-\-\-n in 702/1302-3. However, there are no indications that he incorporated any of the concepts or terminology of either Ibn al\-\-\-Arabi or al-Suhrawardi in his theological works. This development took place only two centuries later with Ibn Abi al-Jum\-\-\-ur al-Ahs\-\-\-i (d. 904/1499) who attempted a synthesis of the different currents.
3.2

Al-Ḥilli follows in his views on theological matters usually the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī. Exceptions are all those doctrines with regard to which the Shiʿites disagreed traditionally with the Muʿtazilites and in regard to which al-Ḥilli follows without exception the Shiʿite tradition.

In contrast to the followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī, notably Ibn al-Malāḥīmī and also Taqī al-Dīn, al-Ḥilli employs frequently philosophical terminology instead of the traditional kalām terminology which was usually also employed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. However, this usually does not lead to disagreements in content between al-Ḥilli and the earlier followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī.

In the following some examples will be given which will demonstrate the main theological issues in regard to which al-Ḥilli and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī disagreed with the Bahshamiyya. It will further be demonstrated in which way al-Ḥilli incorporated philosophical terminology and concepts into the discussion.

One of the chief points on which al-Ḥilli, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya is the rejection of the notion of states (ṭuḥal, pl. ṭawāḥ) which was introduced by Abū ʿHashim in order to conceptualize among other things the nature of the divine attributes. According to Abū ʿHashim essences (dhāt, pl. dhawāt) do not differ from another because of themselves but rather because of the attribute of essence (ṣifāt dhātiyya/ṣifāt al-dhāt) which is necessarily attached to the essence. The same applies to God. God is God because of His attribute of essence. The attribute of essence entails necessarily a number of essential attributes (ṣifāt muqtaḍāt an al-dhāt) as soon as the essence comes into existence. In the specific case of God, who is eternal, these essential attributes are His being knowing, powerful, existing and living.

Al-Ḥilli, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥārī, disagreed. Essences differ because of themselves and do not require any further attribute of essence. God's essence is thus by itself a distinctive essence (dhāt mutamāyyiz) which differs as such from all other essences. His being knowing, powerful, existing and living are consequently defined by al-Ḥilli as qualifications of God's distinctive essence by virtue of which He knows and is powerful etc. but not as states. Accordingly, al-Ḥilli rejected Abu ʿHashim's definition of God's being living as a state because of which it is possible for Him to know and to be powerful. He rather maintained that to be living means that it is not impossible for the living to be knowing and powerful. As for God's being existent, al-Ḥilli similarly rejected Abu ʿHashim's position that this is an essential attribute which is
different from God's essence and maintained rather that God's existence is identical with His essence.

Al-Ḥilli, following again the school of Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, adopted, however, Abū Ḥāshim's answer to the question of how one knows God's attributes. Attributes are known by the distinguishing characteristic (tukm, pl. afkām) which they bring forth. The capability to perform a well-wrought act, for instance, is the distinguishing characteristic of a knowing agent. However, in al-Ḥilli's view the distinguishing characteristic in regard to God points to a matter additional to His essence which exists only in man's imagination but which is in reality nothing but God's distinctive essence. In Abū Ḥāshim's view, the distinguishing characteristic points to a state (ḥāl) of God.

In regard to the attribute of God's being willing al-Ḥilli similarly prefers the view of Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Both theologians rejected the position of the Bāshamiyya according to which God's being willing is a state which is entailed through an entitative determinant (ma'ūn) which does not subsist in a substrate. Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and al-Ḥilli maintained rather that God can only insofar be said to be willing as He acts for a motive (da'ī). When God knows that a certain act contains more benefit than harm, this knowledge is the motive which induces Him to act. There cannot be ascribed to God a will (irāda) in addition to His motive.

The question of man's will (irāda) provides an example of how al-Ḥilli followed in content the position of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī while he substituted philosophical terminology for the traditional kalām terminology.

Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that in the case of man will (irāda) is not identical with the motive. Rather, when man develops the motive for a certain act, he generates in addition to the motive a longing (jālab/muğālaba) for this act. This longing is his will. Al-Ḥilli expresses the same position whereby he employs the philosophical term of inclination (mujār) rather than longing (jālab). With this, al-Ḥilli follows clearly the position of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who employed exactly the same terms in order to describe man's will.

Another illustrative example in which al-Ḥilli follows the position of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī but in regard to which he substitutes philosophical terminology for the kalām terminology concerns the question of God's knowledge about things prior to their existence. This question which was discussed already among the earliest theologians arose from the problem how God can be said to know a thing (shay) in the state of its nonexistence while shay is by definition something which exists.
The position of the school of Abū Hashim was that God's knowledge is always connected with the existence of the things, regardless if they already exist at a specific moment or not. I.e., prior to their existence God knows that they will exist in the future, after their occurrence He knows that they exist now, and after they have passed into nonexistence He knows that they existed in the past. The main purpose of this solution was to avoid any change in God's essential attribute of being knowing. Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-บาشي disagreed. Although he affirmed that God is eternally knowing and that God knows everything perfectly in its reality and how it will be when it will exist, he maintained that once a thing occurs, the relation (taʿalluq) between God's knowledge and the existence of the thing is initiated. Since this initiation was restricted to the relation between the divine knowledge and its object, Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي could defend his view against the allegation that he allowed change in God's essential attribute of knowledge. Al-Ḥilli adopted Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي's view but substituted the philosophical term ʾiḍa fa for the term taʿalluq as it was used by Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي. Al-Ḥilli is moreover not only concerned, as it was the case with Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي, with the initiation of the relation between God's knowledge and its object at the moment of its occurrence, but deals rather with every change which occurs to things. He maintains that every modification of a thing effects a corresponding change in the relation between God's knowledge and its object. The reason for this broader approach in the discussion is that al-Ḥillī's main concern in this question is the rejection of the position of those philosophers who restricted God's knowledge to universal matters to the exclusion of the particulars. With the help of this assumption, al-Ḥillī attempts to refute their position.

In the realm of divine justice, al-Ḥillī followed similarly in most points the doctrine of Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي. One of the views for which Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي was famous, mainly because of the distortion of his view in the presentation of Fāakhir al-Dīn al-Rāzī, was the high importance he ascribed to the motive (daʿī) in the process of the occurrence of an act. Capability without a motive attached to it is insufficient for the occurrence of an act. If a motive exists, however, the act necessarily takes place. Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي disagreed here with the view of the Bahshamiyya who held that capability as such is sufficient to bring forth an act. To this category of acts which occur without a motive belonged in their view e.g. unconscious acts like the movement or the speech of a sleeper. Abū 1-Ḥusayn al-巴شي maintained that even such acts must have a motive even though the agent may not be fully aware of it.
According to al-Rāzi, the position of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi is equivalent to determinism (jabr). He supported this judgement by two arguments. First, he rejected the terminology used by Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi and his followers that with the occurrence of a motive the act is more likely to occur (awṭā bi l-wuqūṭ). Al-Rāzi employs rather the philosophical terminology of contingency and argues that an act is a contingent matter which becomes necessary (wajib) when its cause occurs. This is the case, according to al-Rāzi, when capability and motive for the act come together. Al-Rāzi's main argument, however, is that he maintained that the motive for an act is not generated by man but rather created by God. On the basis of these two assumptions he concluded that Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi's view supported in fact his own view, i.e. that man's acts are subject to determinism (jabr).

Al-Ḥilli followed Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi in content, but employed the philosophical terminology as introduced by al-Rāzi in this discussion. Capability alone is insufficient to effect an act. When capability and motive come together, the act must necessarily occur. This definition rests like in the case of al-Rāzi on the assumption that an act is a contingent matter in the philosophical sense. However, al-Ḥilli holds firm to the Muʿtazilite position of man's free choice in his acts when he outrightly rejects al-Rāzi's second argument that the motive for the act is created by God. He rather adheres to the traditional Muʿtazilite position that the motive for an act is generated by man only.

In regard to the question of God's obligation to act in man's best interest al-Ḥilli similarly agrees fully with the position of Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi who took a position between the school of Baghdad who maintained that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in worldly and religious matters and between the school of Basra who restricted this obligation to religious matters.

The same applies to the question of pain which is inflicted by God and the due compensation which God is obliged to render subsequently in regard to which the school of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi disagreed with the Bahshamiyya concerning a number of minor aspects. Al-Ḥilli follows with regard to these usually the views of the school of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi.

Other points with regard to which al-Ḥilli followed the positions of the school of Abu I-Ḥusayn al-Ṭabarṣi are his rejection of the view of the Bahshamiyya that a thing can be asserted to be a thing in the state of its nonexistence. The assumption underlying the position of the Bahshamiyya was that the attribute of essence of a thing is prior to its existence. Since
al-Ḥilli, as already mentioned, rejected the concept of the attribute of essence, he maintained that a thing can be asserted as a thing only when it becomes existent.

Following this view, al-Ḥilli agreed moreover with the position of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥasarī that God does not let the human bodies pass away into nonexistence prior to their restoration (iṣāda) at the Day of Judgement although He is able to do so. Since nonexistence is equivalent with the vanishing of the essences themselves it would be impossible to restore the individual essences for a second time. This, however, is necessary for all those who are entitled to reward or compensation or who deserve punishment in the Hereafter.

Al-Ḥilli agreed moreover with the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥasarī when he categorically rejected the view of the Bahshamiyya that certain attributes are entailed by an entitative determinant (maʿna, pl. maʿāni). While the Bahshamiyya defined for instance kawn as an entitative determinant which necessitates the atom's being in a particular position, al-Ḥilli maintained that kawn is the occurrence of the atom itself in a particular position. The same difference applies to the variants of kawn which are motion, rest, contiguity (jitimaʿ) and separation (jfitirāq). Other examples in regard to which the Bahshamiyya employed the concept of the entitative determinant are the attributes of life and power of a living being which are entailed by a determinant which subsists in some parts of the body and which entails a state of the total composite and of the specific part of the body in which the determinants subsist. Al-Ḥilli, in contrast, defined a being's being living and powerful simply as the distinctive structure (binya makhṣûsa) of the being which is as such living and powerful without any need for a determinant.

In the realm of physics, al-Ḥilli and the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥasarī rejected the view of Abu Ḥasım and his followers that an accident might not subsist in a substrate (la fi maʿjil). The Bahshamiyya who affirmed this possibility enumerated among the accidents which belong to this category God's will (iṣāda) and hate (karāha) and the accident of passing away (fama-) which entails the annihilation of all bodies and which itself is not enduring. Moreover, al-Ḥilli and the school of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Ḥasarī denied the possibility that an accident may subsist in two substrates. This possibility was asserted by the Bahshamiyya for the accident of composition (aṣṣif) which subsists in two substrates with the result that these two substrates turn out to be like one substrate.
3.3

Having described al-Hilli’s theological positions in some detail, some remarks will now follow about the degree to which he was influenced by the philosophical tradition in his theological works which led to disagreement between him and the earlier Mu'tazilites.

Before going into detail, it should be pointed out that al-Hilli was not only well-trained in philosophy but he also wrote himself a number of philosophical works. Unfortunately, only four of his philosophical writings are partly extant. His Kitāb al-asrār al-khaṭṭiyya which he wrote among his first works was completed in 690/1291. His Kitāb idār al-maqāsid, completed in 694/1294-5, which belongs likewise to the early period of his activities as an author is a commentary on al-Kātibī’s Kitāb Lākmat al-‘Ayn. From among his later philosophical works, only a small portion of his Kitāb Kashf al-Khatā min Kitāb al-Shifa is extant which he completed in 717/1317-8. Another philosophical work which is extant is his Kitāb Marāṣid al-Tadqiq wa-Maqāsid al-Taḥqiq. In addition to these works, we have the titles of about ten more works which al-Hilli wrote on philosophy. As far as the titles indicate, the majority of them is concerned with the philosophy of Ibn Sīna, especially the Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbihāt about which al-Hilli appears to have written a number of commentaries and supercommentaries. He further appears to have written commentaries on the Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt of al-Suhrawardi and the Kitāb al-Mulakkhhas of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razzī. From his extant works, especially his Kitāb al-Asrār al-khaṭṭiyya, one gets the impression that al-Hilli’s general attitude towards the positions of the philosophers was very critical whenever their views disagreed with al-Hilli’s theological views. However, since so few of his philosophical works are extant, this impression may not be representative for his general attitude during his later life.

As for the question to which extent he adopted philosophical concepts in his theological works, the following selected examples which are not meant to cover all aspects in which al-Hilli chose philosophical positions will be based mainly in his early work Kitāb Manāḥīj al-Yaqqīn and his relatively late work Kitāb Nahj al-Mustarshidīn.

Al-Hilli substituted the philosophical subdivision of existent matters into necessary (wājīb), contingent (mumkin) and impossible (mumtana) for the theological one which distinguishes between eternal (qadīm) and created in time (ḥadīth). God is for him thus the necessarily existent (wājīb al-wujūd) who is as such necessary by himself (wājīb li-dhātihi) while everything other than God is contingent by itself (mumkin li-dhātihi) and necessary or impossible because of something else (wājīb
Li-ghayrihi/mumtana⁴⁴ li-ghayrihi). This leads him to disagree with the earlier Mu'tazilites in regard to a number of points. The school of Basra maintained that a body requires an effector only for its occurrence (jūdīth). Once it has gained existence, this body will continue to exist without requiring any longer its effector. Al-Ḥilli disagreed. Since a body like anything else other than God is by itself contingent and necessary through a cause other than it, the occurrence of the body does not modify the body's basic characteristic of being in itself contingent. Therefore, the continuing existence of the body which is defined as a state of the body being necessary by something other than itself, i.e. its effector, requires an effector in the same way as the initial occurrence did.

Moreover, the theologians usually denied that an agent, including God, may annihilate anything. Power, in their view, is by definition only related to the production (jād) of something. The annihilation of something can therefore be achieved only by way of producing the opposite of a thing because of which the thing in question consequently passes away into nonexistence. Al-Ḥilli denies this limitation of power. Since existence and nonexistence are equally related to a contingent matter, a powerful agent may, to the same degree either cause the existence or the nonexistence of a thing.

With the adoption of the philosophical differentiation between existence of a matter as a picture in the intellect (wujūd dhiḥī) which is not linked to its existence in reality and the actual occurrence of the thing in the external world (wujūd khāriji), al-Ḥilli was able to avoid the long dispute among the theologians how it is possible to speak about something nonexistent.

Al-Ḥilli adopts further Ibn Sina's understanding of essence (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd). With regard to God, al-Ḥilli maintains that essence and existence are identical. In regard to anything other than God, al-Ḥilli considers essences as concepts which are neither existent nor nonexistent. When existence is attached to them, samples of essences occur in the external world.

In contrast to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's usage in his Tajrīd al-ʾAqīḍ, al-Ḥilli does not adopt the philosophical concept of jāvar as substance which exists in no subject (mawjūd lā fī mawjud) and accidents (ʿaraḍ, pl. ʿaraḍ) which exist in a subject (mawjūd fī mawjud). Rather, he defined jāvar in the traditional theological way as an atom which occupies space (mutāfakīnyīz) and which cannot be devided and he defined an accident accordingly as that which inheres in something that occupies space (ʾixl fī-l-mutafakīnyīz). Among the accidents, he enumerates those which where traditionally accepted by the theologians excluding the
passing away (fanā') and composition (ta'ād) for the above mentioned reasons. However, despite this traditional theological approach, there are a number of details in Al-Hilli's views about atoms and accidents where he was nevertheless influenced by the views of the philosophers. This shall be demonstrated with the help of some examples. Al-Hilli allows for instance that an accident may subsist in an accident (qiyyum al-qaraḍ bi-l-qaraḍ) which was unanimously rejected by all theologians with the exception of the early Muʿtaṣābī Muʿāammad b. ʿAbbad al-Sulami (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. In order to support this view, Al-Hilli refers to the example which was usually offered by the philosophers. Speed (sur'a) and slowness (baṭaʿ) are accidents which subsist in motion which is similarly an accident. Having accepted this principle, Al-Hilli is able to define a letter (tābīf) similarly to the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident voice (šawā) while the earlier theologians defined a letter usually as a kind (jins) or part (juz') of the voice.

As for the attribute of colour (lawm), Al-Hilli does not follow the view of the Bahlshamīyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow, but he follows in his Kitāb Nahj al-Mustashhidin the position of the bulk of the philosophers that the only real pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his Kitāb Manhāj al-Yaqīn Al-Hilli refrains from taking a position about this question.

4.

It seems, therefore, that Al-Hilli's main importance in his theological writings lies in the development of the "method of the moderns" which had been introduced into Shiʿite theology by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. For the fusion of the philosophical and the theological system which reached its peak two centuries later with the work of Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Ḥasan, it seems that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was of far greater importance since he went much further than Al-Hilli in his adoption of the philosophical system in his theological works. It is moreover evident that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's philosophical works were much more widely read by later scholars than the philosophical writings of Al-Hilli, most of which are lost and only one of which has been edited so far. Al-Hilli's theological works were in contrast considered by later scholars as authoritative theological works.
Alphabetical List of al-Ḥilli’s Works

(1) al-Abū’ b. al-maṣūda fī taḥṣil al-ṣaqīda (theology)
   Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(2) ḫasr al-raja’i
   A manuscript is known to be extant.

(3) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Ṣaḥīh b. Ibrāhīm b. Ṣaḥāb al-Ǧaḥāwī
   No manuscript known.

(4) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥāṣayn b. Ǧali al-Amuli
   No manuscript known.

(5) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Taqī al-Dīn Ḥāṣan b. al-Ḥāṣayn b. al-Ḥāṣan
   al-Ṣirāḥshānawī al-Ǧashānī
   No manuscript known.

(6) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Taqī al-Dīn Māḥmūd b. al-Mawla Ǧayn al-Dīn
   Muḥammad b. al-Qāḍi Ǧabd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī

(7) Ḳayna b. al-Dīn Muḥānna Ǧb. Sinān b. Ǧabd al-Wahhāb
   al-Ḥāṣaynī al-Madānī
   Editions: in al-Majlisī, Bitūr, 107:147-149;
   in Ḥasan b. Yusuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥilli, Ajwībat al-masāʾil al-muḥanna-yya,
   Qum: al-Khayyam, 1401H., 155-157

(8) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Jamāl al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Abī Ǧabd Allāh
   Baṭṭa b. Abī Tāhī b. Ḳali al-Ǧawī

(9) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Raṣīḍ al-Dīn Ḳali b. Muḥammad al-Raṣīḍ al-Ǧawī
   No manuscript known.

    al-Ṣirāḥshānawī
    No manuscript known.

(11) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥāṣayn b. Muḥammad b. Ḳali al-Ṣaʿīdī
    al-Ḥāṣaynī al-Ṭūsī
    Editions: in Muḥammad Muḥṣīn Ğāḥa Buzurg al-Tihrānī, Tabaqāt Ǧarīr al-shīfiyya

(12) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Dīyāʾ al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad Ḥarīrī b. Ḳayn al-Dīn Ḥāṣan b. al-ʿAmīr
    Shams al-Dīn Ḳali b. al-Ḥāṣan al-Ṭabarī
    No manuscript known.

(13) al-ḥṣaṣa li-Ṣaʿīd al-Dīn Ḥāṣayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Ǧayn al-Ǧazarbādī
    No manuscript known.

(14) al-ḥṣaṣa al-kabīr li-Banī Zuhrah
(15) al-Ijaza al-kabira li-Najm al-Din Muhanna² b. Sīrān b. ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Fasayni al-Mudanī

No manuscript known.

(17) al-Ijaza li-Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Yar
No manuscript known.

(18) al-Ijaza li-Qaṣī al-Din Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Rasūl al-Buwayhī

(19) Ajwībat masāʾil Ibn Zubrā
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(20) Ajwībat al-masāʾil al-šaṭḥiyāya
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(21) Ajwībat al-masāʾil al-muḥammaḍiyāya
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(22) al-Adḥaṭya al-fākhirā al-muḥaqqaqa Ṣan al-ʾArbaʿima al-fākhirā
No manuscript known.

(23) Arbaʿima masāʾil fi usūl al-dīn (theology)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(24) Iṣḥād al-adḥiḥāt fi tāḥām al-aḥmād (law)

(25) Iṣṭiṣaṣaʿ al-iṣṭiṣaṣaʿa fi tāḥām māṢani al-akhlāṣ (also: Iṣṭiṣaṣaʿ al-iṣṭiṣaṣaʿa fi tāḥām māṢani al-akhlāṣ) (traditions)
No manuscript known.

(26) Iṣṭiṣaṣaʿ al-nāṣir fi l-baṣt Ṣan al-qadāʿ wa-l-qadar (theology)

(27) al-Aṣrūr al-kuṭṭāya fi l-ʿulām al-qaṣīyya (philosophy)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(28) al-Iṣkāṣir al-maṣūmī al-ışkāṣir (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(29) al-Ḥifṣayn al-fāqīh bayn al-sīdqa wa-l-māṣik (theology)

(30) Amwār al-maṣāʾik fi sharḥ al-yāṣif (theology)
(31) Ḳaḍṭ al-istīḥāṣ fī asmāʾ al-ruwāt (biographic work)  
    Editions: Tehran, 1318.H.

(32) Ḳaḍṭ al-talb is fī kalām al-ruṣūs (philosophy)  
    No manuscript known.

(33) Ḳaḍṭ mukkālasāt al-sunna (traditions)  
    Several manuscripts known to be extant.

(34) Ḳaḍṭ al-muṣāfāt min sharḥ al-īshārat (philosophy)  
    No manuscript known.

(35) Ḳaḍṭ al-maqāsid fī sharḥ ḥikmat gāyn al-qawāṣid (philosophy)  

(36) al-Ḥāfīz al-Ṭaḥā Ǧashar fīmā yajibu gilā ḍammat al-mukallafin  
    min maṭrīfat ʿuss al-dīn (being the 11th chapter of no.110) (theology)  
    Editions: together with the commentaries al-Nāṣir yawm al-naqṣir  
    of Shi‘ite Theology. Translated by W.M. Miller.  

(37) Basṭ al-īshārat (philosophy)  
    No manuscript known.

(38) Basṭ al-kāfiya (grammar)  
    No manuscript known.

(39) Tāḥṣarat al-muṭaṣallim al-dīn (law)  

(40) Tāḥṣir al-abṣāb fī maṭrīfat al-ṭalāḥ al-thalātha (philosophy)  
    No manuscript known.

(41) Tāṭṣir al-ahkām al-sharīʿa gilā madhhab al-imāmiyya (law)  
    Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896

(42) Tāṭṣṣal al-mulakhkhas (philosophy)  
    No manuscript known.

(43) Tadhkirat al-faqahā ǧilā talkhis fatāwi al-ʿulamāʾ (law)  
    (repr. of the 1388/1968 edn.)

(44) Taslīk al-adhīhan ilā ahkām al-imān (law)  
    No manuscript known.

(45) Taslīk al-afhām fi maṭrīfat al-ahkām (law)  
    No manuscript known.

(46) Taslīk al-nafs ilā ʿazārat al-quds (theology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(47) *al-Taʿlīm al-thānī* (also: *al-Taʿlīm al-tāmīm*) (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(48) *Talkhiṣ al-maraṣm fī maṣāḥīṭ al-aḍkām* (law)  
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(49) *al-Tanawwub bayn al-Aṣḥāb wa-l-sīrah al-sūfīyya* (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(50) *Tanqīṭ al-ḥādhāh fī l-aḥādīth al-thalāthā* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(51) *Tanqīṭ qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'kāhidhā ʿan al-Aʿrāmma al-sāhirin*  
(also: *Tanqīṭ qawā'id al-dīn al-ma'kāhidhā ʿan Al Yāsīn and*  
*Tanqīṭ al-qawā'id al-ma'kāhidhā ʿan kitāb al-dīn wa-l-marjān fī l-aḍkāth al-sīrāḥ wa-l-ḥisān* (traditions)  
No manuscript known.

(52) *Tahdīḥ al-nafs fī maṣāḥīṭ al-madāhilī al-khamsa* (law)  
No manuscript known.

(53) *Tahdīḥ al-wuṣūl ilā ʿIlm al-ḥadīth* (legal methodology)  

(54) *Jawāb al-suwar ʿan ṭarīkh al-naskh fī l-aḍkām al-īlāḥyya* (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(55) *Jawāhiṣ al-maqālī fī faṣūl Amīr al-muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī TaṬīb*  
(on the virtues of the Imam ʿAlī)  
No manuscript known.

(56) *al-Jawhar al-nadīlī fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd* (logic)  

(57) *Ḥāshiyyat talkhiṣ al-aḍkām* (law)  
No manuscript known.

(58) *Ḥilāl al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīṣat* (philosophy)  
No manuscript known.

(59) *Khulasat al-qawā'id fī maṣāḥīṭ al-aḍkām* (biographic work)  

(60) *al-Khulasā fī usūl al-dīn* (theology)  
No manuscript known.

(61) *al-Durr al-makhtūn fī sharḥ al-qānūn* (grammar)  
No manuscript known.
(62) al-Durr al-makhtûn fi Usul al-qarîn (logic)
   No manuscript known

(63) al-Durr wa-l-mawjûd al-mukhtâsar
   No manuscript known.

(64) al-Risâla al-sa'diyya (theology)
   Editions: in Kalimât al-mu'azziqin (Tehran, 1315/1898), 338-379.

(65) Risâla fi adab al-bâ'ith al-mukhtâsar
   Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(66) Risâla fi buflân al-jabr (theology)
   No manuscript known.

(67) Risâla fi tâqâqîl ma'nâ al-imân (theology)
   No manuscript known.

(68) Risâla fi khalq al-a'âmîl (theology)
   No manuscript known.

(69) Risâla fi su'ûdâyin sa'ula Gianhumâ al-Khuwaja Rashîd al-Din (theology)

(70) Risâla fi l-mawârîth (legal treatise)
   A manuscript is known to be extant.

(71) Risâla fi wâjib al-â'fâqâd al-jâmi al-dhâd (theology)
   Editions: together with al-Miqdâd al-Suyûti's I'timâd fi sharî'ah wâjib al-â'fâqâd, in Kalimât al-mu'azziqin (Tehran, 1315/1897), 380-422.

(72) Risâla fi wâjib al-înij wa-arkânî min dàn dhikr al-adâ'ya wa-l-mustafâbbât (law)
   No manuscript known.

(73) Sharî'ah jismat al-îshâq (mysticism)
   Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(74) al-Risâla al-qizziyâ
   No manuscript known.

(75) Ghâybat al-îshâq fi ta'zîyâh talkhis al-mawâm (law)
   No manuscript known.

(76) Ghâybat al-wusul wa-înij al-subîl fi sharî'ah mukhtâsar mustahâ al-su'ûl wa-l-amal
   Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(77) Qawâ'id al-âlîkâm fi ma'rifat al-îlal wa-l-â'rabîm (law)
   Editions: Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.)

(78) al-Qawâ'id al-jâ'iyya fi sharî'ah al-risâla al-shamsiyya (logic)
   Editions: Edited by Fâris al-l-fassîn (forthcoming)
   (see Turâthuna, 17 (1409): 243-4).
(79) Qawā'id wa-maqā'id fi l-manṭiq wa-l-fatḥ li wa-l-šāhī (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(80) al-Qawl al-wajiz fi tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Ġazī (also: al-Sīr al-wajiz fi tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Ġazī) (exegetis)
No manuscript known.

(81) Kāshf al-astār fi sharh kāshf al-astār (also: Kāshf al-astār fi sharh kāshf al-astār) (logic)
No manuscript known.

(82) Kāshf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'yī (also: Kāshf al-talbīs fi bayān sayr al-ra'yī) (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(83) Kāshf al-khafū fī min kītāb al-shīrā (philosophy)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(84) Kāshf al-fawā'id ṣalā fi ṣalāt ma ishtamalat ṣalā ṣalā al-mawsūma bi-qawā'id al-qaṣā'id (theology)

(85) Kāshf al-murād fi sharh tajrīd al-ṣīrād (theology)
Editions: Saʿīda: Maṭbaʿat al-ṣīrād 1353/1934;
Qum: al-Maktaba al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.

(86) Kāshf al-mushkilāt min kītāb al-talwīfūt (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(87) Kāshf al-maqād fī maṣrafat al-rijāl (biographic work)
No manuscript known.

(88) Kāshf al-makānān min kītāb al-qānūn (grammar)
No manuscript known.

(89) Kāshf al-yāqīn fī fāṣīd Amīr al-muẓīmin
(on the virtues of the Imam ʿAlī)
Editions: Najaf n.d.

(90) Ṭubb al-ṭikmā (philosophy)
No manuscript known.

(91) al-Maḥāṣith: arbaʿīn masāʾila fi usūl al-dīn (theology)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(92) al-Maḥāṣith al-samīya wa-l-muʿāṣarāt al-naṣīḥiyā (theology)
No manuscript known.

(93) Māhāṣī ʿal-usūl ila ʿilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
(94) Muḥākamāt bayn shurrā́t al-ʾishārāt (philosophy)
    No manuscript known.

(95) Mukhtāsār sharīʿah naḥj al-balāḡa (also: Mukhtāṣar naḥj al-balāḡa)
    A manuscript is known to be extant.

(96) Mukhtalaf al-shiʿa fi al-iḥkām al-sharīʿa (law)
    Editions: Tehran, 1322-24/1905-6

(97) Mādārik al-ʾaṭbāk (law)
    No manuscript known.

(98) Marāṣid al-tadāqq wa-maṣāṣid al-taʿlīq (philosophy)
    A manuscript is known to be extant.

(99) Mawṣūḥat al-anwār (traditions)
    No manuscript known.

(100) al-ʾAḥādīth al-Galīyya fi maṣāḥihat al-ʾArabīyya
    (also: al-ʾAḥādīth al-Galīyya fi ʿIlm al-ʾArabīyya) (grammar)
    No manuscript known.

(101) Mawṣūḥat al-jahm fi sharḥ al-muẓām (theology)
    Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(102) al-Maṣāṣid al-wiṣāfīyya bi-fawāʾid al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiyya (grammar)
    No manuscript known.

(103) al-Muṣaddama fi l-kalām (theology)
    Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(104) Muṣāṣad al-waṣīfīn fi ʿusūl al-dīn (also Muṣṣaṣad al-waṣīfīn) (theology)
    No manuscript known.

(105) al-Muṣāṣadat al-lāqīn (philosophy)
    No manuscript known.

(106) Mukhātaḥā bayn al-Ṣallāma al-lāḥili wa-l-Qasī al-Bayḍawi (law)
    Editions: in Muḥsin al-Amin al-Sāmiʿ, Aṣyān al-shiʿa

(107) Muḥāṣīf al-yaqīn fi ʿusūl al-dīn (theology)
    Editions: Bombay, 1298H.

(108) Munṭaḥah al-majhlāf fi taḥdīth al-madhhab (law)
    Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.

(109) Munṭaḥah al-wasāʾil ilā ʿilm al-kalām wa-l-ʿusūl (theology/ legal methodology)
    Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(110) Muḥāṣīf al-salāḥīf fi ikhtīṣār al-miḥāḥ (law)
    Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.
(111) Minhāj fi manāṣir al-ḥaṣif (legal work)
A manuscript is known to be extant.

(112) Minhāj al-karama fī maʿrifat al-imāma (theology)
Editions: in Minhāj al-summa fī nabawiyah, by Ibn Taymiyyah

(113) Minhāj al-hidāya wa-miṣrī al-dirāya fī ʿilm al-kalām
(also: Minhāj al-hidāya wa-miṣrī al-hidāya) (theology)
No manuscript known.

(114) Nuzūm al-barāhīn fī usūl al-dīn (theology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(115) al-Nukat al-badāʾiš fī taḥrīr al-dhāritiš (legal methodology)
No manuscript known.

(116) Niḥṣāf al-taḥkīm fī maʿrifat aslām (law)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(117) Niḥṣāf al-maʿlam fī ʿilm al-kalām (theology)
Several manuscripts are known to be extant.

(118) Niḥṣāf al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
Numerous manuscripts are known to be extant.

(119) Nahj al-imān fī taṣfiṣ al-Qurʾān (exegesis)
No manuscript known.

(120) Nahj al-ṣaqq wa-kashf al-sīdīq (theology)
Beirut, 1982.

(121) Nahj al-ṣafā fī ʿilm al-maṣānī (logic)
No manuscript known.

(122) Nahj al-mustashridīn fī usūl al-dīn (theology)
Editions: together with Irshād al-taḥkīm ilā nahj al-mustashridīn by
al-Miqdād al-Suyūṭī;
edited by Mahdi al-Raṣādī. Min makhṣūṣ at maktabat āyat Allāh al-Maṣashi
al-Sūma no. 10. Qum: Maktabat Sayyīd al-shuḥadāʾ, 1405 H.

(123) Nahj al-wuṣūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (legal methodology)
No manuscript known.

(124) Nahj al-waddāh fī aʿlāma al-sīrāf (traditions)
No manuscript known.

(125) al-Nuṣr al-muṣṭaṣfī fī ʿilm al-munṣīf (logic)
No manuscript known.

(126) Wajīb al-wuṣūl wa-l-salāt (also: Wajībat al-wuṣūl) (law)
No manuscript known.
Further Readings:


